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The Forgotten Dinner Guest:

The "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt"

Standard in a Motion for a Judgment

of Acquittal in a Federal Bench Trial

Jared Kneitelt

Abstract

In comparison to civil trials, criminal trials are decided on more stringentstandardsofproof However, motionsforjudgmentofacquittal in criminal non-jury trials are currently decided on a mere legal sufficiency standard as opposed to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. This Article examines the lack ofreasoning and uniformity in deciding these motions as well as the potential dangers and injustices posed to a defendant by applying a lower standard. Through an examination of both domestic andforeign law, the author argues for the

application ofthe "beyond a reasonable doubt "standard when determining motions for judgment of acquittal in criminal non-jury trials.

Welcome to the Dinner Party: Introduction

The standard for judging a civil trial is lower than the standard for

judging guilt in a criminal trial, and there is no jury in a non-jury trial.

Somehow-despite these two very obvious conclusions-the nineteenth

century standard for determining a motion for a directed verdict in a civil

jury trial is still applied to our modem motion for a judgment of acquittal

in a criminal non-jury trial.

In a criminal trial, at the close of the government's case-in-chief, the

defense may make a motion for a judgment of acquittal on one or more

offenses charged.' If the motion is unsuccessful and the defense calls

a case, the defense may make another motion for ajudgment of acquittal

at the close of its case.This Article concerns only the motion at the end

of the government's case. At present, the motion will succeed only if the

government has not presented legally sufficient' evidence of all the

elements of the particular offense or offenses.

This Article discusses why, in a non-jury trial, the "beyond a reasonable

doubt" standard should be applied-instead of merely the legal

sufficiency standard-when the bench considers a motion for ajudgment

of acquittal. Not knowing whether the government has proven-in the

judge's mind-the defendant's guilt before inviting the defendant to call

a case actually militates against the presumption of innocence, the

assurance that the government discharges its burden, and the defendant's

right to remain silent.

This Article shows that the jurisprudence in the United States

improperly cites, for the standard for determining whether to grant or

deny a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a non-jury trial, either the

standard in a jury trial or the standard for appellate review. This Article

examines the historical (lack of) development of the motion for a

judgment of acquittal and the perceived constitutional preclusion against

the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Namely, the bench-as the

arbiter of law-cannot usurp a defendant's Sixth Amendment protection

to be tried on the facts by a jury of his peers.' Of course, in a non-jury

trial, the bench is both the arbiter of law and fact-finder;' hence, there

is no Sixth Amendment preclusion.

At present, there is no rule in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

explicitly governing a motion for ajudgment of acquittal in a bench trial.

Is it Rule 236 ("Jury or Nonjury Trial") or Rule 29' ("Motion for a

Judgment of Acquittal [in a Jury Trial]") that governs the motion?

Although district court judges in almost all of the reported decisions

assume Rule 29 governs, there are several cases in which district court

judges have turned to Rule 23 as the governing statute.' Further, even

among the authors of treatises on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

there is disagreement as to what Rule governs.' Wright's Federal

Practice and Procedure discusses a motion for a judgment of acquittal

in a bench trial under Rule 29.o Yet Moore's Federal Practice states,

"Rule 29 has no real application when a case is tried by the court since

the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal.""

This Article concludes by proposing a new Rule 29(e) to resolve this

ambiguity and to make clear that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard

is the standard that should be employed in determining a motion for

a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial.

I. By Invitation Only: Respondez S'il Vous Plait

A criminal defendant is not guilty unless proven guilty; the government

bears the burden of proving the criminal defendant guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt; " and the government (not the defendant) must

introduce evidence sufficient to persuade the fact-finder, beyond a

reasonable doubt, ofthe defendant's guilt.14 Thus, ifthe government does

not introduce evidence to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt, then the defendant is not guilty.

At the conclusion of the government's case, the government's case

will presumably-and in almost all circumstances-be at its highest. If

the government has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt after

the presentation of its evidence, when will it ever be able to prove its case

beyond a reasonable doubt? This begs the very simple question: If the

defendant is not guilty at the conclusion of the government's case-inchief,

why should the defendant be "invited" to call a defense?

Although the government may have presented legally sufficient

evidence of the offenses charged, the judge still may not find at the close

of the government's case that the government proved its case beyond a

reasonable doubt. For example, the judge may find the accounts of the

government witnesses to be unworthy of belief (either alone or in

combination) or circumstantial evidence presented to be too circumspect

to sustain a conviction. As always, the government must prove its case

beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden is without the assistance of any

defense evidence (including the defendant's testimony)."

Effectively, "inviting" the defendant to call a defense case-despite

the uncertainty of whether the government has proved its case beyond

a reasonable doubt at the close of its case and whether the judge would

have acquitted the defendant of an offense charged-reduces the govemment's

burden at that stage. This "invitation" to the defendant to call

defense witnesses or for the defendant to testify on his own behalf

militates against the government's obligation to prove its case. Such an

invitation should be correctly considered as not only a reduction of the

government's burden (and therefore impermissible burden shifting) but

also a violation of due process.'

Elevating the government's burden at the motion for a judgment of

acquittal stage to beyond a reasonable doubt actually strengthens the

presumption that the defendant is not guilty and properly holds the

government to its burden. This strengthens the requirement that the

government prove its case based solely on its own evidence and without

the assistance of the introduction of a defense case.

1I. The Forgotten Dinner Guest:

Historical Development of the

Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal

The motion for ajudgment of acquittal in criminal suits evolved from

its counterpart in civil procedure. Federally, in the late 1700s, civil

judges could withdraw a civil case from ajury and decide the case; then,

the common law motion for non-suit came; and finally, in the midnineteenth

century, the civil motion for a directed verdict emerged. 7

"The motion for judgment of acquittal in criminal cases came still later

and was probably influenced by these earlier developments in the civil

trial."" "The early cases directing acquittal did so without citing any

authority but apparently assumed such power was inherent in thejudge's

role as presiding officer."' 9

Indeed, Moore's Federal Practice states that Rule 29 ("Motion for

a Judgment of Acquittal" in ajury trial) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure was modeled on Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.20 "Thus, a motion for acquittal [in a jury trial] is equivalent

to a motion for a directed verdict (now called 'judgment as a matter of

law' under Civil Rule 50), or judgment notwithstanding the verdict

(judgment n.o.v.) under pre-Rules practice." 2 1

However, there still remains no legislation specifically directed

towards a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a criminal bench trial.

This is due to legislative oversight based, seemingly, on the mere

importation of the standards employed in a civil jury trial into a criminal

non-jury trial without appropriate consideration for the defendant's

exposure to a deprivation of his liberty, his right to remain silent, the

government's burden ofproving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt rather than by a preponderance, and the presumption of the

defendant's innocence.

III. The Head of the Table:

The Prevailing Legal Sufficiency Standard

The standard for judging a motion for a judgment of acquittal-in a

jury trial at least-is based on Burks v. United States." "The prevailing

rule has long been that a district judge is to submit a case to the jury if

the evidence and inferences therefrom most favorable to the prosecution

would warrant thejury's finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt."23 "Even the trial court, which has heard the testimony of witnesses

first hand, is not to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility

of witnesses when it judges the merits of a motion for acquittal."24 This

view is accepted on the Sixth Amendment right that a defendant be tried

by a jury of his peers. In jury trials, the court cannot substitute its

judgment for that of the jury.25 To do so would usurp the power of the

jury and violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee to be tried by one's

peers26 as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process

protections.

To date, however, the Supreme Court has not considered the standard

on a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a non-jury trial. This might

be because esteemed and erudite practitioners have effectively written

off considering the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in bench trials

and, as such, the issue has not reached the Supreme Court. For example,

Section 467 of Wright's Federal Practice and Procedure states, "A

motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's

evidence in a case tried to the court is considered by the same standard

as in ajury case."29 However, none of the cases Wright relies on for this

proposition in Section 467 are on point.

IV. The Unwelcome Guest:

When Wright Is Wrong

For support, Wright cites United States v. Salman,o United States v.

Pierce, 3 ' United States v. Magallon-Jimenez, 32 United States v. Carter,"

and UnitedStates v. Stubler34-none ofwhich were decided by the United

States Supreme Court. Salman involved a pre-trial dismissal of an

indictment." Pierce involved the test to be applied in appellate review"

of the sufficiency of evidence after a trial, jury or bench, and quoted

Jackson v. Virginia for the appellate standard." Thus, Pierce did not

concern a determination by the trial court on a motion for acquittal."

Both Magallon-Jimenez and Carter held that, in both jury and bench

trials, "there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the [government], any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt."" As with Pierce, Magallon-Jimenez and Carter

concerned the appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence and did

not relate to a determination of a motion for acquittal at trial level.40

Out of those five cases, Stubler was the only one that happened to be

a bench trial.4' In Stubler, the defendant moved for a judgment of

acquittal after he was convicted.42 The district court held that "Rule 29

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows for a motion for

judgment of acquittal[, and] [t]he standard the court must apply is

whether 'the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction."" Further,

the district court held "this standard remains the same [even in] a non-jury

trial."' In a surprise demonstration of a lack of understanding of the

standard-Stublerc ited civil case law regarding the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act to support that holding.4 5

Wright's Federal Practice and Procedure demonstrates-by its citation

to these inapposite cases-that it has not appropriately analyzed the

jurisprudence in making its assertion that the standard in a bench trial is

the same as in ajury trial. None of these cases concern a trial-level determination

of a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial at the

conclusion of the government's evidence. Thus, Wright has propounded

a baseless proposition on a mere cursory examination, preventing a

proper analysis of the standard. A more thorough examination is

warranted.

V. A Nostalgic Affair:

Let Us Go Back to Camp

In the United States, there are only three cases found to date in which

the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was discussed in a bench trial:

United States v. Camp,46 United States v. Laikin,4 and United States v.

Cascade Linen Supply Corp. of New Jersey.8

In Camp, a two-defendant case tried before a district judge, a motion

for ajudgment of acquittal was made after the close of the government's

evidence and before either defendant put on a case.49 The court expressly

considered whether the standard on the motion should be "whether the

evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction" and held, "logically,"

that standard meant whether the government's evidence proved the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.o According to the court,

if the government did not prove the defendant guilty and the case were

to proceed, continuing with the case

would put upon the defendant the risk that by his own evidence, as by

testimony produced on cross-examination, he might supply the evidence

which convinces the trier of fact of his guilt, where absent such evidence

the trier of fact would not be so convinced. To subject the defendant in a

criminal case to such a risk would be contrary to the principles by which the

criminal law has developed in [the United States]. It would in effect require

the defendant to assist in providing a vital element of the evidence which

convicts him."

Thus, Camp allowed for a coordinated effort of (1) the presumption of

innocence, (2) the government's evidentiary burden of proving the

defendant guilty (if it can), and (3) the defendant's right to remain silent

to protect the defendant from conviction."

While Camp's reasoning appears sensible, some courts have expressly

rejected the Camp logic. In Laikin, the defendant in a bench trial

requested the court to consider whether, on his motion for a judgment

of acquittal, the government's evidence proved him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. The Laikin court, citing the Seventh Circuit case of

United States v. Feinberg5,4 held that the correct standard is taking the

government's evidence in the light or aspect most favorable to the

government." The Feinberg" court, in making its holding, cited Glasser

v. United States,57 United States v. Velasco," and United States v.

DeNiro.9 However, Glasser, Velasco, and DeNiro each refer to the

standard of appellate review.60

United States v. Cascade Linen Supply Corp. of New JerseyP' similarly

declined to follow Camp.62 The defendants in a bench trial moved

forjudgments of acquittal after the close of the government's evidence.

Camp was not followed in Cascade Linen because the district judge

held-without citing any authority-that determining whether the government

proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of the

government's case would "severely impair the orderly disposition of the

issues."" The judge also held, again without citing any authority, that

determining the motion using the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard

"would be tantamount to submitting the evidence to the trier of the facts

twice. To this defendants are not entitled."65

The judge further indicated, without discussion, that "[he was] unable

to understand [the] defendants' contentions that the presumption of their

innocence and their right to remain silent and offer no proof [were] in

some way diminished or impaired by [his] ruling."6 From the language

and tone in Cascade Linen, it appears the judge was eager to convict the

defendants. Indeed, after the defendants' respective motions for judgment

of acquittal were denied, the defendants rested.' They were then

convicted.68

Herein lies the problem. The court can readily deny a motion for a

judgment of acquittal. Upon this denial, the defendant is still left to

speculate and guess whether the government satisfied its burden-on the

government's evidence-of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. Thus, not knowing whether the government has discharged

its burden leaves the presumption of innocence and the defendant's

right to remain silent in competition with the government's

obligation to discharge its burden when, in fact, these three aims should

be cooperating with one another.

VI. Pass the Salt:

The International Tribunals-An Exercise

in Impermissible Burden Shifting

As a comparative study, consider that the proceedings before international

war crimes tribunals are bench trials." Although in a number of

instances the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was argued by

defense counsel on a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of

the government's case,70 the use of the legal sufficiency standard became

settled law. Unfortunately, this was without the benefit of any real

analysis.

The Appeals Chamber Judgement in Prosecutor v. Jelisid" is the

leading case among the international tribunals" for use of the legal

sufficiency standard in determining a motion for a judgment of

acquittal-known as Rule 98 biS73-at the close of the prosecution's

evidence.

The Appeals Chamber inJelisid followed74 its prior Appeals Chamber

Judgement in Prosecutor v. Delalid," which in turn cited the Appeals

Chamber Judgement in Prosecutor v. Tadie," the Appeals Chamber

Judgement in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,n and the Trial Chamber's

"Decision on Motion for Acquittal" in Prosecutor v. Kunara78 for

support.

However, those portions of Aleksovski and Tadid referred to by the

Delalid Appeals Chamber Judgement concern the standard of appellate

review in determining whether a trial chamber's factual finding can

withstand appellate scrutiny-that is, legal sufficiency.79 As such, Tadid

and Aleksovski are incorrectly cited by Delalid for the proposition that

the standard a trial court sitting without a jury should use to determine

a motion for a judgment of acquittal is also legal sufficiency."

The Trial Chamber's "Decision on Motion for Acquittal" in Prosecutor

v. Kunara6 held--citing the Trial Chamber's "Decision on Defence

Motions for Judgement of Acquittal" in Prosecutor v. Kordi8 '-that the

appropriate test to be applied on a motion for a judgment of acquittal

"was not whether there was evidence which satisfied the Trial Chamber

beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused (as the defence in

that case had argued), but rather it was whether there was evidence on

which a reasonable Trial Chamber could convict." 82

All things considered, the Trial Chamber in Kunaral did its best not

to impugn the prior jurisprudence on the issue. Thus, Kunarad, shifting

the burden of proof off the shoulders of the prosecution, noted-without

citing any authority-that

[i]f the Trial Chamber were entitled to weigh questions of credit generally

when determining whether a judgment of acquittal should be entered, and

if it found that such a judgment was not warranted, the perception would

necessarily be created (whether or not it is accurate) that the Trial Chamber

had accepted the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses as credible. Such

a consequence would then lead to two further perceptions: (1) that the

accused will bear at least an evidentiary onus to persuade the Trial Chamber

to alter its acceptance of the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, and

(2) that the accused will be convicted if he does not give evidence himself.

He would virtually be required to waive the right given to him by the

Tribunal's Statute to remain silent.83

An analysis ofKordi--the case spawning the seminal misunderstanding

of the proper application of a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the

international tribunals-is thus warranted.

First, the Trial Chamber in Kordid seemed satisfied that because other

trial chambers at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia were using a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt,

using a lower standard was the appropriate thing to do." Without any

analysis, the Trial Chamber indicated that "[i]mplicit in Rule 98 bis

proceedings is the distinction between the determination made at the

halfway stage of the trial, and the ultimate decision on the guilt of the

accused to be made at the end of the case, on the basis of proof beyond

a reasonable doubt."" The Trial Chamber failed to provide any basis or

reasoning for that distinction.

Next, the Kordid Trial Chamber looked to the Trial Chamber's

"Decision on Defence Motion to Dismiss Charges" in Prosecutor v.

Tadid," the Trial Chamber's "Order on the Motions to Dismiss the

Indictment at the Close of the Prosecutor's Case" in Prosecutor v.

Delali6," the Trial Chamber's "Decision of Trial Chamber I on the

Defence Motion to Dismiss" in Prosecutor v. Blaikid," and the Trial

Chamber's "Decision on Motion for Withdrawal ofthe Indictment against

the accused Vlatko Kupregki6" in Prosecutor v. Kupregkid."

The Trial Chamber in Tadid merely held-without citing any

authority-that, because it would ultimately determine whether each

count was proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the conclusion of the

entire case, it would only determine whether the evidence presented was

legally sufficient."o

In Delalid, the Trial Chamber held that a motion for judgment of

acquittal will be denied if, "as a matter of law, there is evidence before

it relating to each of the offences in question for the accused persons to

be invited to make their defence."9' There was no analysis as to the

foundations for this principle nor did this decision cite any jurisprudence.

After citing Tadi6 and Delalid, the Trial Chamber in Blakd.W held:

CONSIDERING that, on these legal foundations, based on a strict application

of the spirit and letter of the Rules, the Trial Chamber limits the review

of the Motion:

[1] in fact: to the mere hypothesis that the Prosecutor omitted to provide

the proof for one of its counts;

[2] in law: to the mere hypothesis that the Prosecution failed to show a

serious prima facie case in support of its claims.

That decision was made without any legal analysis as to the foundations

for this principle nor did the decision cite any jurisprudence for that

Holding.

Lastly, the Trial Chamber in Kupregkid merely referred to the test

enunciated in Tadid and dismissed the motion to withdraw the indictment

because the Trial Chamber was of the opinion that there was "evidence

as to each count charged in the indictment, which were it to be accepted

by [the] Trial Chamber, could [have] lawfully support[ed] [the] conviction.""

Other than referring to Tadi6, the Kupreikid Trial Chamber did

not provide any legal support for that standard.

Kordid then examined the practice in five domestic jurisdictions-

England and Wales,94 Canada," Australia," the United States, 97 and

Spain 9 8-and found "the test that is applied on motions for acquittal at

the end of the Prosecution's case is not the high standard of proof beyond

[a] reasonable doubt. 9 However, the practice referred to in England and

Wales, the United States, and Spain is in relation tojury trials, not bench

trials.'o As explained above, the low legal sufficiency standard is used

in jury trials because the judge is precluded from usurping the factfinder's

role. As such, the jury trial practice in these jurisdictions

provides Kordid no support. Next, Australian practice allows for ajudge

to acquit a defendant after the close of the prosecution's case'o' and is

in direct contradistinction to Kordid.

Finally, Canadian practice is the lone exception that does provide some

support for Kordid's proposition. However, in Canada-per statutory

requirement-the fact-finder can only render a verdict after the defendant

declares, after the prosecution's evidence, whether the defendant intends

to call a defense case (and upon such an affirmative declaration, after

hearing the defense evidence).102 Notably, there is no such requirement

in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the international tribunals nor

in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the United States. Consequently,

Kordid's citation to Canadian procedure does not support

Kordid's proposition.

Ultimately, what happened at the international level was that a meager

legal analysis emanating from the domestic practice in jury trials was

applied to the motion for a judgment of acquittal in non-jury trials. Of

course, the jurisprudence demonstrates worry that the court would usurp

thejury's function and, as such, would allow only for a court's determination

as to legal sufficiency on a motion for ajudgment of acquittal. This

led to a fundamental misunderstanding of how such a motion should be

decided in non-jury trials and a failure to recognize that it is impossible

for trial judges to usurp the fact-finder's function because the trial judges

themselves are the fact-finders.

Further propounding this misunderstanding was (1) the misapplication

of the standard of appellate review (as in Tadid and Aleksovski) as the

standard for a trial court's determination, (2) reliance on a "consistent

pattern" in the jurisprudence of solely a legal sufficiency standard

(although this pattern developed without any forethought),' and (3) a

demurrer to the trial chambers' ultimate responsibility of determining

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of the trial. What remains

is a very low hurdle for the prosecution to meet for a motion for a

judgment of acquittal to be denied. Thus, "since the denial of such a

motion is, in no sense, an indication of the view of the Chamber as to the

guilt of the accused on any charge, little meaningful guidance is provided

to the accused in connection with his defence case.""

As highlighted in Kunara6, the jurisprudence implicitly prefers-in

attempts to avoid the twin perceptions that the accused has to persuade

the trial chamber "to alter its acceptance of the credibility of the prosecution's

witnesses" and that "the accused will be convicted if he does not

give evidence himself'-the defense to call a case instead of holding the

prosecution to its evidentiary burden of proving the defendant guilty. 05

It should be the opposite. The government should be held to its

burden. If, and only if, the government has satisfied its burden ofproving

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may then

choose to waive his right to silence. Indeed, if the trial chamber finds

that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the government

has discharged its burden.

VII. The Invitee: The Proposed Rule 29(e)-

"Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal,

Nonjury Trial"

To remedy the problems previously discussed, the author proposes

the following addition to Rule 29:

(e) Nonjury Trial. After the government closes its evidence, the

court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal

of any offense on the ground that the government did not prove that

the defendant is guilty of such offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Note, with this proposed rule, the defendant may-but is not required

to-make a motion for a judgment of acquittal. Further note that the

language in the proposed Rule 29(e) would require the court, upon such

a motion, to make a decision-without reservation-on the motion.

Of course, if acquitted on one or more counts, double jeopardy

attaches. If the bench indicates, upon decision of the motion, there will

be a conviction on one or more counts, the defendant may elect to call

a case and may elect to testify. The proposed rule does not include the

prospect for a defendant to make a motion at the conclusion of the

evidence.'o

Just Desserts: Conclusion

"[I]t may fairly be said, that, so soon as a man is arrested on a charge

of crime, the law takes the prisoner under its protection, and goes about

to see how his conviction may be prevented."' Elevating the standard

in determining a motion for a judgment of acquittal from prima facie to

beyond a reasonable doubt is the "forgotten" protection that a criminal

defendant deserves. Odd would be the prosecutor who would fuss about

elevating the standard. After all, the government bears the burden of

proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the

government cannot do so on its own evidence, the defendant must be not

guilty.

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法律论文优秀范文4

买卖合同取回权制度研究-法律论文-免费论文

买卖合同取回权制度研究

随着市场经济快速发展，人们的购买需求日益增长，如何利用有限的资金，购买更多的商品，日益成为人们社会群众的问题，所有权保留制度越发受到人们的重视，《中华人民共和国合同法》第134条肯定了所有权保留制度，然而未明确该条款的适用范围，更多具有宣示性而缺乏操作性。2012年，最高人民法院颁布了《关于审理买卖合同纠纷案件适用法律问题解释》（以下简称《买卖合同司法解释》），该解释进一步的完善了所有权保留制度，首次明确认可了出卖人的取回权，但有关所有权保留买卖中取回权的行使条件、程序和限制等问题还不够明确，甚至与相关法律条文有所冲突，在司法适用过程中产生了困境，出卖人的取回权作为所有权保留制度核心内容，对买卖合同的履行与交易的完成具有重大影响，若这些问题得不到解决，必将在实践中引发更多的矛盾和冲突。

一、取回权的法律性质

所谓取回权，是指在所有权保留的情形下，当买受人的违约行为损害到出卖人合法权益的情况下，出卖人享有取回标的物的权利。出卖人通过所有权保留的方式将标的物让与买受人，由买受人在支付价款前先行占有标的物，导致出卖人与标的物相互分离，因为标的物被买受人占有和使用，出卖人只以保留标的物所有权的方式担保其余价款的实现，一旦买受人不按照约定支付价款，或不当使用、处分标的物，都会对出卖人造成极大的利益损失，出卖人取回权制度的设立价值就在于此。关于取回权的性质，学说上观点重多，归纳起来主要存在以下几种观点：（一）解除权效力说。此观点认为取回权的行使将导致买卖合同的解除，即“附条件买卖契约之失效，乃基于取回权之行使，故取回权之行使，亦生解除权之效力”①；（二）附法定期限解除说。此观点是解除权效力说的衍生，认为取回权系附有法定期限的解除权出卖人在取回标的物时，合同尚未解除，待到买受人超过期限不行使回赎权的，买卖合同解除②；（三）恢复同时履行说。此观点认为，当买受人迟延履行时，出卖人不主张解除合同而主张取回标的物的，其目的在于取消自己将标的物的占有先行转移给买受人的给付，以此来恢复同时履行之状态；（四）就物求偿说。此观点认为，取回权是出卖人实现就物求偿价金的特别程序，出卖人签订保留所有权买卖合同的目的即是为了担保未支付的剩余价款能够得到及时清偿。

笔者认为，我国所有权保留制度中出卖人的取回权更符合就物求偿说。首先，解除权效力说其衍生学说没有理清取回权制度与解除合同制度的根本区别，依此种观点，取回权的行使会导致买卖合同的解除，双方的权利义务关系将回到签订合同之前的状态，均不再受到原合同的约束，出卖人可以另行出卖标的物，不存在出卖人出卖标的物后价金的归属问题，这显然与《买卖合同司法解释》第37条第3款所规定的内容不符；其次，出卖人之所以愿意与买受人签订保留所有权的买卖合同，最主要目的是为了担保剩余价款能够得到支付，而不是为了消灭双方之间的买卖合同关系，取回权的行使若导致合同的解除，将使出卖人丧失对买受人未偿剩余价款的请求权基础，买受人也没有回赎权和再出卖请求权，无法促进合同的履行，这与所有权保留制度设计的本意也不相符；再次，同时履行说虽然描述了取回权的行使目的，但取回权的价值不限于此，也无法为买受人回赎权等后续问题提供良好的解决方案；最后，就物求偿说能够很好的解释为何《买卖合同司法解释》第37条第3款规定的出卖人在出卖标的物后，仍有剩余价值的，应当返还给买受人所有。根据该说，出卖人取回标的物是为了获得自己应得的价金，在实现目的之后，仍然有剩余价值的就应当返还给买受人。综上所述，所有权保留中的取回权明显更符合就物求偿说。

二、取回权的行使

（一）取回权的行使条件

在保留所有权交易当中，出卖人是否行使取回权，关乎剩余价款是否能够得到清偿，对买受人的权益也具有重大影响，因此行使取回权必定要具备一定的条件，《买卖合同司法解释》第35条第1款规定，在买受人出现了法定情形，对出卖人造成损害的，出卖人可以取回标的物法定情形包括：1、未按约定支付价款；2、未按约定完成特定条件；3、将标的物出卖、出质或者作出其他不当处分。笔者认为，这里的“对出卖人造成损害”结合当事人交易目的与该款下项目的具体规定，应当是指出卖人的价金难以受偿或得不到清偿，即买受人的违约行为必须达到相当严重的程度，致使合同的目的无法实现，出卖人才能够行使取回权。《买卖合同司法解释》第35条第1款第1、2项规定的买受人未按约定支付价款和完成特定条件的，虽然没有强调违约的程度，但该项义务是保留所有权转移的条件，买受人不履行此义务即属于重大违约，出卖人得以行使取回权，此为所有权保留应有之义，但第3款规定的买受人将标的物进行处分是否严重损害了出卖人的利益仍值得讨论。如前所述，出卖人行使取回权应当基于买受人的违约行为，但出卖人与买受人在签订合同时可能并未约定买受人不得将标的物出质或出卖，买受人的行为不一定构成违约，此外，出卖人保留所有权的目的是为了保障价金债权的实现，标的物的情况并不是其首要关心的问题，买受人对保留物进行了经济性的利用，事后只要其依约支付价款或者完成其他特定条件的，即可取得保留物所有权，也不会妨害出卖人的利益，笔者建议，在第3项原有的基础上，对该项进行限缩，补充“当事人约定除外”的规定。综上，出卖人行使取回权必须满足一下条件：一是买受人违反义务，该义务的产生是基于当事人的约定或合同性质产生的买受人义务；二、该义务的违反将会导致合同的目的无法实现。

（二）取回权行使的程序

出卖人对取回权的行使，属于私力救济的范畴，需要买受人的配合，如果买受人拒绝配合，则出卖人的利益难以得到维护，此时，需要公力救济的方式予以保护，然而《买卖合同司法解释》对取回权的行使程序未作规定。参照我国台湾地区的经验，所有权保留中取回权的行使程序准用动产抵押的规定，笔者认为，出卖人取回标的物在于督促保留买受人履行义务，担保债权的实现，出卖人所享的是一种担保利益，应当可以准用我国《民事诉讼法》关于实现担保物权的特殊程序的规定③，但一个问题是，通过法院实现担保物权是没有给买受人保留回赎期间的，这样势必会损害买受人的权益，也不符合取回权制度设立的初衷。笔者认为，出卖人在行使取回权前应当在一定的期限内提前通知买受人并说明是由和履行期限，在买受人不行使回赎权之后，出卖人可向人民法院申请实现担保物权的特别程序，并向法院提供已通知买受人的依据，法院在审查之后，再决定是否准用《民事诉讼法》关于实现担保物权的特殊程序。

三、取回权的限制

出卖人取回权的限制指尽管已经满足了取回的条件，但出现了出卖人取回权不能行使或取回权归于消灭的情形。取回权作为出卖人最直接有效的救济方式，将会对双方的权利义务关系产生重大影响，考虑到平衡双方利益和交易公平，必须对出卖人行使取回权作出一定的限制。

（一）买受人履约状态对取回权的限制

随着所有权保留中价款的逐步支付和条件的完成，买受人对标的物所享有的经济利益越来越多，产生了一种对标的物享有所有权的期待，这种期待可以排除相对人和第三人的侵害，并最终转化为对标的物的所有权。我国司法实践中上不乏对“期待”这种法律状态保护的事例，但在立法上一直没有明确期待权是否属于一种权利。《买卖合同司法解释》第36条第1款规定，买受人已支付标的物总价款的75％上，出卖人主张取回保留物的，人民法院不予支持。上述规定表明了法律对买受人期待权的保护，以买受人的履约状态对抗出卖人行使取回权，实际上就是以买受人的期待权对出卖人的取回权作出限制，如果允许出卖人可以任意行使取回权，则会使买受人的期待利益处于无法预测的状态④。解释认为，当买受人向出卖人支付总价款75%以上时，买受人的期待权最终转化为所有权的可能性更大，此时买受人期待利益的保护更为重要，同时，出卖人已经获得了75%的价款，其利益已经较大程度得到实现，没有必要再通过行使取回权的方式获得剩余价款，此时若买受人出现违约行为，出卖人可以通过其他救济的方式，保证价金债权的实现。必须注意的是，如果买受人出现破产的情形，基于上位法优于下位法的原则，即使买受人依据支付了总价款的75%以上，出卖人仍可以行使取回权获得标的物，因为此时买受人仍没有获得标的物的所有权，将标的物列为责任财产明显有背公平原则。

（二）善意取得制度对取回权的限制

所有权保留中，出卖人将标的物转让给买受人占有使用，致使自身与标的物相互分离，如果买受人在标的物上设立其他权利，出卖人行使取回权就可能与买受人设立的权利发生冲突。善意取得，是指出卖人和买受人之间以转移或成立物权为目的实施法律行为，出卖人若己把标的物交付给买受人或登记在买受人的名下，即使欠缺处分权，买受人因于受让标的物时处于善意，也依然可以取得标的物物权的制度。善意取得制度是消灭或对抗所有权的一种手段，而所有权保留买卖中的出卖人的取回权是凭借自身对标的物的所有权，因此善意取得制度自然可以对取回权进行限制，《买卖合同司法解释》第36条第2款也予以确认。依据《物权法》第106条的规定，善意取得应当符合以下条件：1、受让人为善意；2、以合理的价格转让；3、已进行登记或交付。由于我国没有建立所有权保留买卖的登记制度，外人很难知晓出卖人与买受人之间的所有权保留条款，因此在买受人对标的物进行无权处分时，第三人一般都是善意，在我国现行的制度框架下，第三人很容易构成善意取得，从而对抗出卖人的取回权，致使出卖人通过保留所有权的方式担保价金债权的目的落空，这就需要对何为“善意”进行界定。由于我国所有权保留制度只适用于动产，而动产交易一般不涉及登记公信力问题，买受人的占有标的物态在动产交易中即具有公信力，因此，应该更多的从第三人的主观是否存在善意进行判断，具体言之，更多的考虑第三人是否支付了合理的对价，也要综合考虑各种客观因素，如交易的时间、地点、交易人之间的关系等等⑤。

结语

《买卖合同司法解释》通过4个条文的规定，初步搭建起了我国所有权保留制度的框架，为所有权保留制度的司法实践指明了方向。出卖人取回权作为所有权保留制度制度的核心，对买卖双方利益的实现具有重大影响，但相关体系的建立还不够完善，希望我国在现行的取回权相关制度的基础上，结合中国现实社会中所有权保留买卖合同的实践情况，建立起完整并具有“中国特色”的出卖人取回权制度。

 

  

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我们现行法律制度存在的问题及对策-法律论文-免费论文

我们现行法律制度存在的问题及对策

我们现行法律制度存在的问题及对策

关键词：四级多网 立法层阶 援助经费 受援面 法律援助法 援助门槛

内容提要：

现阶段，我国援助机构形成四级多网的格局，在取得较大成绩的同时，存在三大问题：一、立法层阶问题；二、援助经费问题；三、受援面问题。对策有三：一、制定法律援助法；二、提升援助经费；三、实质上降低援助门槛。

内容：

自2003年国务院颁发《法律援助条例》以来，通过近十年的努力，我国法援已摸索出一套符合国情的制度。法援组织形成四级多网架构的形式，在中央一级，司法部法律援助司和法援中心统一对全国法律援助工作实施指导、协调，省级法援中心对本省法援工作实施指导、协调，市级法援中心对本区域工作实施管理和组织，县级中心具体组织实施本地法援工作。除政府设置的专门法律援助机构外，我国还存在社会团体和民间组织设立的法援机构。法律援助的专业实施主体确定为律师、公证员、基层法律工作者和社会志愿者。法律援助的资金来源主要是政府出资、社会捐赠。

应该说，几年来我国法律援助制度取得了极大的成绩，对于提升我国国家形象和应对人权批评，发挥了不可替代的作用。但是我国的法律援助制度在现实中仍存在着多方面的问题。

一、立法层阶问题

国务院颁发的法律援助条例是我国关于法律援助制度方面的首部规范性方法，在法律位阶上属于行政法规。在社会上反响较大，但它本身先天不足，不能适合社会舆论的巨大反响，享受不到人大通过的法律应有的法律实施监督检查等。社会对法援的认识程度、重视程度不高，这从而也是法援面临的人员、经费等困境的重要原因之一。

二、援助经费问题

这个问题包括两方面：一方面法援虽是政府责任，虽然被写入条例，但实际各级各地政府重视程度不一样，各省各地财政支持力度差异巨大。即使是同属发达地区，各县市的财政拨款也不相同。将争取财政支持寄希望于领导的重视和法援机构的争取等人为因素上，而不从制度上保障，是为法援困境一大弊病。另一方面，纵观全国法援办案补助，有报道说平均每案仅有区区的几十元，以此来吸引优秀人才办理援助案件，岂非天方夜谭。指派专业人士办案，仅强调其义务性，而不鼓励其积极主动性， 法援办案的质量无从保障，久而久之伤害的就是社会对法援的信任。少部分地方，法律援助开展得有声有色，大部分地方法律援助流于形式，正是当今中国法援弊端的现状之一。

三、受援面问题

随着社会法律事务的大幅度增加，法律援助事务大量增加。但是，能够享受到法律援助的案件，据有关报道说，不足十分之一，致使大量应援案件得不到援助。

针对上述存在的问题，笔者认为还是应该从制度上来进一步完善。据笔者所知，有些经济欠发达地区，法律援助仅限于上级交办和信访案件，国务院和地方规定范围内，大量的应援案件无人问津，这种选择性援助使法律援助有名无实。对此，笔者建议：

一、建议制定《法律援助法》。

由全国人大或人民代表大会常务委员会立法，引起最高立法机关重视，进而引发社会各阶层关注、讨论，引起地方领导的重视和舆论的关注，以期创造更好的援助环境。

二、法律援助经费大幅度提升，并加大监管力量。

制定严格的援助案件补贴发放制度，严防地方政府部门侵占挪用，并逐步提高补贴标准。从现实情况看，法援补助标准畸低，严重影响了办案人员的积极性，使法援流于形式。必须提高补贴标准，虽然不能使之与律师收费标准相一致，但必须根据当地居民的收入支出、经济发展水平，制定相应标准，并逐步提高。更关键的是，鉴于目前的法律援助机构隶属于司法行政部门的行政管理，政府拨款或中央补贴经费先行打入司法局账户，又由司法局划转法援机构的管理模式，在实际工作中，不可能避免出现司法行政机关挪用、截留援助经费的情况。甚至于地方政府法援经费有名无实的情况大量存在，建议将法援经费专项管理，加强监管力度，拿出切实可行的举措，将援助经费由专门部门掌管，直接发放援助人员。

3、降低援助门槛。

首先对经济困难的标准把握上，应从宽掌握，不能局限于城市最低生活保障户、农村五保户、农村低保户。对于因遭受重大变故，致使经济困难者，以及特定案件，应当进行援助。当然，在现在经费保障不力的情况下，应援尽援尚且难以做到，拓展新的援助领域并不切合实际，但援助事业要想做大、做好，必须有此前瞻性考虑。现阶段，能够充分不打折扣地落实国务院、省级的规定，对现有法援机构来说是已是重任在肩了。其次，对于国务守和省确定的援助范围对象，结合最高法院和司法部联合下发的文件，切实做发衔接工作，法院经审查确定进行救助的案件，不必再进行审查，无须再履行法援的申请、调查、核实、决定等程序，可以凭法院的救助决定等文书，径行立案受理，切切实实地履行两部门规定。现实生活中，对此落实和衔接得并不十分融洽，希望加强监管，从而实质上也降低了援助门槛。

 

参考书目：

1、《法律援助读本》，主编：熊中元，黄河出版社，2008年1月第1版。

2、《法律援助考察报告及理论研讨文集》，主编：贾午光，中国方正出版社，2008年9月第1版。

 

  

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论基层法律援助工作站工作的现状及完善-法律论文-免费论文

论基层法律援助工作站工作的现状及完善

论基层法律援助工作站工作的现状及完善

【内容摘要】法律援助制度作为一种重要的法律保障制度能够为经济困难群众或者特殊案件中的弱势群众提供法律服务，保障社会群体合法权益的公益事业，对于构建社会主义和谐社会起到重要的保障作用。而法律援助工作站则是建立在社会最基层，与人民群众联系最直接最密切的基层法律援助机构。近几年来，基层法律援助工作站的工作迅速开展，在保障基层弱势群众的合法权益方面发挥着不可替代的重要作用。同时，也应当看到基层法律援助工作站存在着明显的亟待解决的问题，应当进一步完善，发挥好法律援助工作站的便民优势，就能更好地利用社会资源，为弱势群体提供便捷、高效、优质的法律服务。

【关键词】 法律援助工作站 法律援助 现状 完善

一、基层法律援助工作站工作的现状

我国法律援助制度经过多年的发展，已逐渐凸显出其在维护司法公正、完善社会救助体系、构建和谐社会中的巨大作用。基层法律援助工作站的设立，是法律援助事业向社会基层的纵深延伸，是构建和谐社会的重要措施之一。近年来，我国基层法律援助工作站从无到有，基层法律援助事业得到快速发展。

目前，我国基层的法律援助工作站主要依托各乡镇司法所而建立，具有规范的名称、办公场所以及工作人员。基层法律援助工作站工作人员同其所在乡镇司法所工作人员为同一套人员，乡镇司法所所长兼任基层法律援助工作站站长。以东昌府区法律援助中心为例，其辖区共设立16个乡镇法律援助工作站，其所辖法律援助工作站均有规范名称、独立场所、工作人员以及规范化工作规章制度。

在法律援助工作德开展方面，基层法律援助工作站致力于降低法律援助受援门槛，开通法律援助“绿色通道”，扩大法律援助在农村基层的覆盖面。同时，对于法律援助案件的受理、办理、结案后卷宗的装订实行规范化管理，努力提高法律援助工作质量。在法律援助案件的办理处理上，基层法律援助工作站侧重于以调解方式化解纠纷矛盾，这有利于维护广大农村社会的和谐稳定。法律援助工作站使法律援助的触角延伸到最基层的广大农村社会，增强了乡镇司法所的职能，而且保护了广大困难农民、贫弱群众的合法权益，维护了法律的公平公正与尊严，使县区级法律援助网络体系进一步得到完善。

二、当前基层法律援助工作站工作中面临的困境

我国法律援助工作站的建设从无到有，快速发展，在维护基层社会贫困弱势群众的合法权益方面发挥着不可替代的积极作用。但仍然存在着明显的亟待解决的问题，归纳起来主要有以下几个方面：

第一，法律援助办案经费保障方面。目前，法律援助经费问题已成为制约基层法律援助工作发展的瓶颈。基层法律援助工作经费紧缺，制约着基层法律援助工作站宣传、日常办公等工作的运转。工作人员办案补贴经费的偏少甚至缺乏同样导致基层法律援助工作人员的工作积极性滞后。

第二，基层法律援助工作人员方面。基层法律援助工作站工作人员主要存在如下问题：一是基层工作人员紧缺，目前基层法律援助工作站中的工作人员一般身兼数职，在开展法律援助工作的同时负担着乡镇机关的行政工作，工作任务繁重，工作人员常常不堪重负，导致弱势群众的权益得不到及时保护。二是基层法律援助工作人员的专业素质参差不齐，工作效率，工作质量有待于进一步提高。

第三，法律援助知识宣传力度方面。由于目前我国农民群众接受教育程度普遍不高以及受传统封建思想的影响，广大农民群众对法律援助知识缺乏深入的了解；同时由于近年来农民外出务工人数的增加，对于这一部分人群的法律知识宣传，现有的宣传方式还不能全部覆盖，从而导致一部分农民对法律援助工作不了解，甚至有的农民不知道有法律援助这种法律保障制度。

三、完善基层法律援助工作站工作的对策

针对基层法律援助工作站工作中存在的以上问题，笔者认为应从以下几方面对基层法律援助工作进行完善。

第一，提高对基层法律援助工作的重要性认识，加大基层法律援助经费的投入和保障。充足的经费保障是基层法律援助工作的顺利开展的必要前提。市、区、乡镇等各级政府应当提高认识，加大对基层法律援助工作的财政支持力度。同时对于办案经费的使用情况应设立行之有效的监管制度，确保法律援助办案经费按时足额发放到位。

第二，进一步完善基层法律援助工作站的规范化建设。首先应对基层法律援助工作人员进行法律援助知识业务培训，基层法律援助工作涉及到法律中的诸多方面，对法律援助工作人员的工作能力有较高要求，因此应在积累办案经验的同时提高工作人员的法律援助业务素质；其次，对基层法律援助案件的受理、审批、案件办理、卷宗装订归档等进行业务培训指导。通过基层法律援助工作站规范化建设提高法律援助的工作质量，切实维护受援群众合法权益，提升群众对法律援助工作的满意度。

第三，加大法律援助知识的宣传力度。法律援助知识宣传对于提高法律援助知晓率，普及法律援助知识具有重要作用。我国农村社会由于自然村庄分布零散、进城务工人员增多等因素，导致法律援助宣传存在一定难度，法律援助知识普及率不高。为此，基层法律援助工作站应加大宣传力度，利用各种机会，多种方式下乡镇，进社区，利用农民群众赶大集的机会宣传法律援助知识。同时要求各乡镇基层法律援助工作站粉写法律援助宣传标语，极大程度地提高了人民群众对法律援助的知晓度。

第四，积极同法院、司法等部门沟通协作。由于基层法律援助工作中较多涉及婚姻家庭关系、继承纠纷、农民工维权以及邻里生活纠纷等方方面面，因此，法律援助工作站在办理案件过程中应积极同法院、妇联、工会、共青团能机构协调沟通，做好工作衔接工作；在涉及进城务工农民工的维权案件中，应积极同异地法律援助机构协调沟通，确保各类受援群众法律援助维权之路畅通无阻不断档。

基层法律援助工作站的设立有效地改善了基层困难群众寻求法律援助难的问题，为维护乡镇农村和街道社区的和谐稳定发挥了积极作用。在现阶段法律援助工作开展中，各级政府、基层法律援助工作站应采取多种措施改进和完善当前基层法律援助工作站的运作和管理，提高法律援助工作的整体效能，推动基层法律援助工作的全新发展，真正做到法律援助工作站延伸法律服务、便捷利民，努力实现法律援助全覆盖，切实维护受援对象的合法权益。最大限度地发挥其职能作用。

 

  

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论房地产中介法律服务-法律论文-免费论文

论房地产中介法律服务

浅论对房地产中介服务违规行为的规制

 宁夏宁正律师事务所 姜有育

 [论文摘要]随着房地产行业的骤升，房地产中介服务机构越来越多。房地产中介服务活动的开展，促进了房地产交易专业化、规范化的发展，但由于起步晚、立法不健全，有些中介服务机构由于利益的驱动，存在许多违规操作的行为。本文拟从规范和调整中介服务行为入手，探讨中介服务违规行为的表现形式、形成原因等问题，并对中介服务违规行为的规制及立法提出相关建议，以加强立法和监管机制，严格市场准入，确立责任保险制度，保障房地产中介服务业健康、有序的发展。

[关键词] 房地产 中介服务 违规行为 规制

 目 录

一、 房地产中介违规行为的主要表现形式………………………… 第3页

（一）对不允许上市交易的房地产违规代理、挂牌出售……………第3页

（二）疏于核查客户、房屋的关键信息………………………………第3页

（三）隐瞒影响交易成功的重要信息…………………………………第3页

（四）为交易双方规避法律出谋划策…………………………………第3页

（五）违规获取额外利益………………………………………………第4页

（六）资金监管存在漏洞………………………………………………第4页

二、 房地产中介违规行为成因分析………………………………… 第4页

（一）立法层级低、缺乏可操作性，致使规制房地产中介难以做到有法可依…………………………………… 第4页

（二）市场准入门槛太低，人员素质普遍不高。………………… 第4页（三）监督检查执行不到位，也是问题突出、屡禁不止的重要原因 第5页

三、规制房地产中介违规行为的几点建议……………………………第5页（一）严格市场准入并建立等级评定制………………………………第5页（二）设立行业协会……………………………………………………第5页（三）确立过错归责原则和中介机构的免责事由……………………第5页（四）建立中介行业保证金制度和责任保险制度……………………第6页

（五）定期组织培训和考核，提高中介机构和人员素质……………第6页

浅论对房地产中介服务违规行为的规制

近几年来，随着房地产行业的不断升温，房地产市场空前活跃，房地产中介服务机构如雨后春笋般纷纷涌现。一方面，中介机构为房地产交易的供求双方起到了媒介和桥梁的作用，促进了房地产交易的专业化、规范化运作；另一方面，由于我国房地产中介服务起步较晚，立法也不够健全，房地产中介服务行为混乱无序，侵害当事人权益、欺诈消费者事件时有发生。鉴于此，迅速规范房地产中介行为、平衡当事人之间的利益，已成为我国立法必须面对的迫切问题。本文拟从规范和调整中介行为入手，探讨中介违规行为的表现形式、形成原因等问题，并对中介违规行为的规制及立法提出相关建议。

一、 房地产中介违规行为的主要表现形式

根据《城市房地产管理法》及《城市房地产中介服务管理规定》的有关规定，所谓房地产中介服务，是指房地产咨询、房地产价格评估、房地产经纪等活动的总称。房地产中介服务违规行为，是指房地产中介服务机构和人员违反相关法律、法规的规定，故意或过失操作房地产咨询、价格评估和经纪等中介服务活动，扰乱房地产交易市场的正常秩序，损害房地产交易各方当事人合法权益的行为。其主要表现形式为：

（一）对不允许上市交易的房地产违规代理、挂牌出售。

根据我国《城市房地产管理法》第38条的规定，对于未依法登记领取权属证书的或具有法律和行政法规规定禁止转让的房地产不得转让。但在实践中，一些房地产中介为了促成交易，赚取佣金，往往隐瞒标的房屋仍为承租公房或为限制年限内的经济适用住房等不能上市交易的事实，或随意承诺短期内即可解决交易障碍，致使买卖双方在随后交易失败后与房地产中介公司就中介费应否支付产生纷争。

（二）疏于核查客户、房屋的关键信息。

如中介公司未对客户出示的身份证明、房屋权属证明进行合理查验；未仔细审查待售房屋有无抵押、有无出租及私搭乱建，并核查委托的客户是否是真正有权出售房屋的权利人；对于属于夫妻共有财产的房屋，未要求配偶一方出具同意出售和委托办理的证明；对于待出售房屋为遗产的，未要求全体遗产继承人出具同意出售的书面委托文件。

（三）隐瞒影响交易成功的重要信息。

如不向买受人如实说明其已知的可能不利于成交的待售房屋的历史情况或周边环境或必要生活设施情况。

（四）为交易双方规避法律出谋划策。

如承诺为无实力购房人办理“高评低供”还贷款手续，或帮助外地买受人虚构在京纳税或社保缴费一年以上证明，或为迎合买受人少交税款的心理帮助买卖双方签订“阴阳合同”，恶意促成双方达成不平等或不合法交易。

（五）违规获取额外利益。

如中介公司要求买受人全程通过其交纳钱款、委托办理过户，从而千方百计阻挠买受人与出卖人见面，再通过隐瞒房屋真实成交价、一再加价等手段将多收取的售房款据为己有。又如中介公司怂恿当事人采取恶意毁约、一房二卖的方式高价出售房产以为自身获取更高的居间服务费，从而引发房屋买卖连环纠纷。

（六）资金监管存在漏洞。

大部分交易中，买卖合同约定的定金和首付款由中介公司自行监管，有的交易总价较高，定金和首付款的总和可能高达几十万元，这大大增加了交易风险；一些银行只对在该银行贷款的购房客户实行免费资金监管，而对于不在该银行贷款的购房客户不提供资金监管服务或收取高额的监管服务费用，导致购房客户不愿或无法选择由第三方办理资金监管。

二、 房地产中介违规行为成因分析

（一）立法层级低、缺乏可操作性，致使规制房地产中介难以做到有法可依。

在国家立法层面，目前我国尚无专门的房地产中介管理立法，仅有的几个条文只散见于《城市房地产管理法》第58条(有关房地产中介服务机构的设立条件)及《合同法》第23章(有关居间合同的一般规定)中，并不足以起到规范现实生活中复杂多样的房地产中介行为的作用。而建设部颁布的《城市房地产中介服务管理规定》、国家工商总局颁布的《经纪人管理办法》、国家计委和建设部联合发布的《关于房地产中介服务收费的通知》及建设部和财政部等七部委联合下发的《关于整顿和规范房地产市场秩序的通知》等均属于部委规章和文件，难以被法院直接引用，这就在一定程度上弱化了法律对市场的宣示功能，并助长了房地产中介机构漠视法规、不时突破甚至违法乱纪的行为。

 

而且，有关房地产中介方面的管理规范多系指引性和框架性的规定，缺乏一些必要的明确指引和具体要求。如在房地产中介机构的设立条件上，无论是《城市房地产管理法》还是《城市房地产中介服务管理规定》均只要求有必要的财产和经费，但何为“必要”却未进一步规定，这就意味着只要符合《公司法》规定的下限即人民币10万元即可登记注册一家房地产经纪公司，无疑这样的条件设计对于经手大量交易、可能会给客户造成巨大经济损失的房地产中介企业而言未免过于宽泛了。

（二）市场准入门槛太低，人员素质普遍不高。

我国房地产从业人员的执业准入也相当宽松，不仅学历要求低，而且考试也简单，造成房地产中介从业人员良莠不齐，缺乏必要的敬业精神和职业道德素养，埋下了诸多隐患。

（三）监督检查执行不到位，也是问题突出、屡禁不止的重要原因。

根据《经纪人管理办法》第18条的规定，对经纪人的违法活动，工商行政管理机关有权按照有关法律法规及行政规章予以处罚。但事实上，每年房地产中介虽然占据经纪类投诉的首位，却鲜见有职能机关监督检查、处罚违规中介的报道。

在美国，由私人推动组建有贯通上下的全美房地产经纪人协会、州协会和市协会这样一套金字塔状、网络化的格局建制，如入会会员有任何违纪行为，协会即有权吊销其相应资格甚至对其提起诉讼。但在我国，目前并未建立起全国性的房地产经纪协会组织，一些地方也尚未组建区域性的房地产经纪协会，已经建立的地区性经纪协会在会员数量、服务培训、管理手段上均表现得相当疲软。

三、规制房地产中介违规行为的几点建议

要解决房地产中介违规行为带来的诸多问题，唯一标本兼治的办法就是加强和完善立法。建议立法应确立以下几方面内容：

（一）严格市场准入并建立等级评定制。

国外对房地产中介机构及其执业人员一般都实行严格的准入制度，如美国的执照制度和我国香港地区的发牌制度，都严格限制入市机构和人员的标准和条件。近几年，我国虽然也实行中介机构资质及执业人员资格管理制度，但由于标准及条件规定偏宽，且监管机构把关不严，导致大量的低素质机构及执业人员进入市场。为此，我国要通过立法对从业机构和人员分别实行严格的准入标准，建立中介公司等级评定制，推动中介市场优胜劣汰，并为购房者提供区分良莠的依据。

（二）设立行业协会

许多发达国家和地区都建立了房地产中介行业协会，并通过行业协会制订了执业道德规范，对中介违规行为加以规范和限制。行业协会可配合政府有关部门对不正当的中介行为进行处罚，如在本行业内部公告严重违规或严重缺乏资信的中介机构或人员名单，禁止其在一定期限内重新执业以及开除出协会等等。

（三）确立过错归责原则和中介机构的免责事由

过错责任是指因行为过错导致他人损害时应承担的责任。根据客观过错说，行为人的行为只要违反了法律所设定的规则、义务，那么即存在过错。在房地产中介服务中，中介机构从事违规行为一般都出于过错和重大过失。鉴于中介违规行为的特殊性，为避免诉讼中受害方对中介机构的主观过错举证困难，应适用过错推定原则，实行举证倒置。只要中介服务给当事人带来损失，当事人就可以起诉中介机构，中介机构必须提供证据证明自己主观无过错或过失，否则就应当推定其有过错，应当对受害方的损害承担责任。

（四）建立中介行业保证金制度和责任保险制度。

为防止中介机构及从业人员挪用客户资金或携款潜逃，相关主管部门应推动建立中介行业保证金制度和责任保险制度，以保障整个房产中介行业的良性发展。保证金指房地产中介机构缴纳，用于保障房地产中介行业中消费者权益的专用款项。也可以借鉴我国旅游业明确规定的旅行社质量保证金制度，建立房地产中介行业的保证金制度。设置房地产中介行业责任险，使作为被保险人的房地产中介机构在承办房屋中介业务过程中因过失给委托人及其利害关系人造成的损失，可由保险公司在赔偿限额内负责赔偿，这有利于保障安全交易和当事人的合法权益。

（五）定期组织培训和考核，提高中介机构和人员素质。负责监管房地产中介机构的行政部门应定期组织培训，及时传达有关房地产中介行为操作规范的法律法规，通报具有违规行为的中介机构和业务人员以及采取的处罚措施，以起到警诫作用，从而树立中介机构和个人的诚信意识。同时，还应加强对中介机构高层的培训，树立中介机构的危机意识，引导中介机构从无序扩张、寅吃卯粮的发展状态逐渐向理性判断市场走势、维护市场稳定健康发展的方向发展

 

  

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