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The Forgotten Dinner Guest:

The "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt"

Standard in a Motion for a Judgment

of Acquittal in a Federal Bench Trial

Jared Kneitelt

Abstract

In comparison to civil trials, criminal trials are decided on more stringentstandardsofproof However, motionsforjudgmentofacquittal in criminal non-jury trials are currently decided on a mere legal sufficiency standard as opposed to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. This Article examines the lack ofreasoning and uniformity in deciding these motions as well as the potential dangers and injustices posed to a defendant by applying a lower standard. Through an examination of both domestic andforeign law, the author argues for the

application ofthe "beyond a reasonable doubt "standard when determining motions for judgment of acquittal in criminal non-jury trials.

Welcome to the Dinner Party: Introduction

The standard for judging a civil trial is lower than the standard for

judging guilt in a criminal trial, and there is no jury in a non-jury trial.

Somehow-despite these two very obvious conclusions-the nineteenth

century standard for determining a motion for a directed verdict in a civil

jury trial is still applied to our modem motion for a judgment of acquittal

in a criminal non-jury trial.

In a criminal trial, at the close of the government's case-in-chief, the

defense may make a motion for a judgment of acquittal on one or more

offenses charged.' If the motion is unsuccessful and the defense calls

a case, the defense may make another motion for ajudgment of acquittal

at the close of its case.This Article concerns only the motion at the end

of the government's case. At present, the motion will succeed only if the

government has not presented legally sufficient' evidence of all the

elements of the particular offense or offenses.

This Article discusses why, in a non-jury trial, the "beyond a reasonable

doubt" standard should be applied-instead of merely the legal

sufficiency standard-when the bench considers a motion for ajudgment

of acquittal. Not knowing whether the government has proven-in the

judge's mind-the defendant's guilt before inviting the defendant to call

a case actually militates against the presumption of innocence, the

assurance that the government discharges its burden, and the defendant's

right to remain silent.

This Article shows that the jurisprudence in the United States

improperly cites, for the standard for determining whether to grant or

deny a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a non-jury trial, either the

standard in a jury trial or the standard for appellate review. This Article

examines the historical (lack of) development of the motion for a

judgment of acquittal and the perceived constitutional preclusion against

the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Namely, the bench-as the

arbiter of law-cannot usurp a defendant's Sixth Amendment protection

to be tried on the facts by a jury of his peers.' Of course, in a non-jury

trial, the bench is both the arbiter of law and fact-finder;' hence, there

is no Sixth Amendment preclusion.

At present, there is no rule in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

explicitly governing a motion for ajudgment of acquittal in a bench trial.

Is it Rule 236 ("Jury or Nonjury Trial") or Rule 29' ("Motion for a

Judgment of Acquittal [in a Jury Trial]") that governs the motion?

Although district court judges in almost all of the reported decisions

assume Rule 29 governs, there are several cases in which district court

judges have turned to Rule 23 as the governing statute.' Further, even

among the authors of treatises on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

there is disagreement as to what Rule governs.' Wright's Federal

Practice and Procedure discusses a motion for a judgment of acquittal

in a bench trial under Rule 29.o Yet Moore's Federal Practice states,

"Rule 29 has no real application when a case is tried by the court since

the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal.""

This Article concludes by proposing a new Rule 29(e) to resolve this

ambiguity and to make clear that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard

is the standard that should be employed in determining a motion for

a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial.

I. By Invitation Only: Respondez S'il Vous Plait

A criminal defendant is not guilty unless proven guilty; the government

bears the burden of proving the criminal defendant guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt; " and the government (not the defendant) must

introduce evidence sufficient to persuade the fact-finder, beyond a

reasonable doubt, ofthe defendant's guilt.14 Thus, ifthe government does

not introduce evidence to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt, then the defendant is not guilty.

At the conclusion of the government's case, the government's case

will presumably-and in almost all circumstances-be at its highest. If

the government has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt after

the presentation of its evidence, when will it ever be able to prove its case

beyond a reasonable doubt? This begs the very simple question: If the

defendant is not guilty at the conclusion of the government's case-inchief,

why should the defendant be "invited" to call a defense?

Although the government may have presented legally sufficient

evidence of the offenses charged, the judge still may not find at the close

of the government's case that the government proved its case beyond a

reasonable doubt. For example, the judge may find the accounts of the

government witnesses to be unworthy of belief (either alone or in

combination) or circumstantial evidence presented to be too circumspect

to sustain a conviction. As always, the government must prove its case

beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden is without the assistance of any

defense evidence (including the defendant's testimony)."

Effectively, "inviting" the defendant to call a defense case-despite

the uncertainty of whether the government has proved its case beyond

a reasonable doubt at the close of its case and whether the judge would

have acquitted the defendant of an offense charged-reduces the govemment's

burden at that stage. This "invitation" to the defendant to call

defense witnesses or for the defendant to testify on his own behalf

militates against the government's obligation to prove its case. Such an

invitation should be correctly considered as not only a reduction of the

government's burden (and therefore impermissible burden shifting) but

also a violation of due process.'

Elevating the government's burden at the motion for a judgment of

acquittal stage to beyond a reasonable doubt actually strengthens the

presumption that the defendant is not guilty and properly holds the

government to its burden. This strengthens the requirement that the

government prove its case based solely on its own evidence and without

the assistance of the introduction of a defense case.

1I. The Forgotten Dinner Guest:

Historical Development of the

Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal

The motion for ajudgment of acquittal in criminal suits evolved from

its counterpart in civil procedure. Federally, in the late 1700s, civil

judges could withdraw a civil case from ajury and decide the case; then,

the common law motion for non-suit came; and finally, in the midnineteenth

century, the civil motion for a directed verdict emerged. 7

"The motion for judgment of acquittal in criminal cases came still later

and was probably influenced by these earlier developments in the civil

trial."" "The early cases directing acquittal did so without citing any

authority but apparently assumed such power was inherent in thejudge's

role as presiding officer."' 9

Indeed, Moore's Federal Practice states that Rule 29 ("Motion for

a Judgment of Acquittal" in ajury trial) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure was modeled on Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.20 "Thus, a motion for acquittal [in a jury trial] is equivalent

to a motion for a directed verdict (now called 'judgment as a matter of

law' under Civil Rule 50), or judgment notwithstanding the verdict

(judgment n.o.v.) under pre-Rules practice." 2 1

However, there still remains no legislation specifically directed

towards a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a criminal bench trial.

This is due to legislative oversight based, seemingly, on the mere

importation of the standards employed in a civil jury trial into a criminal

non-jury trial without appropriate consideration for the defendant's

exposure to a deprivation of his liberty, his right to remain silent, the

government's burden ofproving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt rather than by a preponderance, and the presumption of the

defendant's innocence.

III. The Head of the Table:

The Prevailing Legal Sufficiency Standard

The standard for judging a motion for a judgment of acquittal-in a

jury trial at least-is based on Burks v. United States." "The prevailing

rule has long been that a district judge is to submit a case to the jury if

the evidence and inferences therefrom most favorable to the prosecution

would warrant thejury's finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt."23 "Even the trial court, which has heard the testimony of witnesses

first hand, is not to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility

of witnesses when it judges the merits of a motion for acquittal."24 This

view is accepted on the Sixth Amendment right that a defendant be tried

by a jury of his peers. In jury trials, the court cannot substitute its

judgment for that of the jury.25 To do so would usurp the power of the

jury and violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee to be tried by one's

peers26 as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process

protections.

To date, however, the Supreme Court has not considered the standard

on a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a non-jury trial. This might

be because esteemed and erudite practitioners have effectively written

off considering the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in bench trials

and, as such, the issue has not reached the Supreme Court. For example,

Section 467 of Wright's Federal Practice and Procedure states, "A

motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's

evidence in a case tried to the court is considered by the same standard

as in ajury case."29 However, none of the cases Wright relies on for this

proposition in Section 467 are on point.

IV. The Unwelcome Guest:

When Wright Is Wrong

For support, Wright cites United States v. Salman,o United States v.

Pierce, 3 ' United States v. Magallon-Jimenez, 32 United States v. Carter,"

and UnitedStates v. Stubler34-none ofwhich were decided by the United

States Supreme Court. Salman involved a pre-trial dismissal of an

indictment." Pierce involved the test to be applied in appellate review"

of the sufficiency of evidence after a trial, jury or bench, and quoted

Jackson v. Virginia for the appellate standard." Thus, Pierce did not

concern a determination by the trial court on a motion for acquittal."

Both Magallon-Jimenez and Carter held that, in both jury and bench

trials, "there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the [government], any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt."" As with Pierce, Magallon-Jimenez and Carter

concerned the appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence and did

not relate to a determination of a motion for acquittal at trial level.40

Out of those five cases, Stubler was the only one that happened to be

a bench trial.4' In Stubler, the defendant moved for a judgment of

acquittal after he was convicted.42 The district court held that "Rule 29

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows for a motion for

judgment of acquittal[, and] [t]he standard the court must apply is

whether 'the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction."" Further,

the district court held "this standard remains the same [even in] a non-jury

trial."' In a surprise demonstration of a lack of understanding of the

standard-Stublerc ited civil case law regarding the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act to support that holding.4 5

Wright's Federal Practice and Procedure demonstrates-by its citation

to these inapposite cases-that it has not appropriately analyzed the

jurisprudence in making its assertion that the standard in a bench trial is

the same as in ajury trial. None of these cases concern a trial-level determination

of a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial at the

conclusion of the government's evidence. Thus, Wright has propounded

a baseless proposition on a mere cursory examination, preventing a

proper analysis of the standard. A more thorough examination is

warranted.

V. A Nostalgic Affair:

Let Us Go Back to Camp

In the United States, there are only three cases found to date in which

the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was discussed in a bench trial:

United States v. Camp,46 United States v. Laikin,4 and United States v.

Cascade Linen Supply Corp. of New Jersey.8

In Camp, a two-defendant case tried before a district judge, a motion

for ajudgment of acquittal was made after the close of the government's

evidence and before either defendant put on a case.49 The court expressly

considered whether the standard on the motion should be "whether the

evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction" and held, "logically,"

that standard meant whether the government's evidence proved the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.o According to the court,

if the government did not prove the defendant guilty and the case were

to proceed, continuing with the case

would put upon the defendant the risk that by his own evidence, as by

testimony produced on cross-examination, he might supply the evidence

which convinces the trier of fact of his guilt, where absent such evidence

the trier of fact would not be so convinced. To subject the defendant in a

criminal case to such a risk would be contrary to the principles by which the

criminal law has developed in [the United States]. It would in effect require

the defendant to assist in providing a vital element of the evidence which

convicts him."

Thus, Camp allowed for a coordinated effort of (1) the presumption of

innocence, (2) the government's evidentiary burden of proving the

defendant guilty (if it can), and (3) the defendant's right to remain silent

to protect the defendant from conviction."

While Camp's reasoning appears sensible, some courts have expressly

rejected the Camp logic. In Laikin, the defendant in a bench trial

requested the court to consider whether, on his motion for a judgment

of acquittal, the government's evidence proved him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. The Laikin court, citing the Seventh Circuit case of

United States v. Feinberg5,4 held that the correct standard is taking the

government's evidence in the light or aspect most favorable to the

government." The Feinberg" court, in making its holding, cited Glasser

v. United States,57 United States v. Velasco," and United States v.

DeNiro.9 However, Glasser, Velasco, and DeNiro each refer to the

standard of appellate review.60

United States v. Cascade Linen Supply Corp. of New JerseyP' similarly

declined to follow Camp.62 The defendants in a bench trial moved

forjudgments of acquittal after the close of the government's evidence.

Camp was not followed in Cascade Linen because the district judge

held-without citing any authority-that determining whether the government

proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of the

government's case would "severely impair the orderly disposition of the

issues."" The judge also held, again without citing any authority, that

determining the motion using the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard

"would be tantamount to submitting the evidence to the trier of the facts

twice. To this defendants are not entitled."65

The judge further indicated, without discussion, that "[he was] unable

to understand [the] defendants' contentions that the presumption of their

innocence and their right to remain silent and offer no proof [were] in

some way diminished or impaired by [his] ruling."6 From the language

and tone in Cascade Linen, it appears the judge was eager to convict the

defendants. Indeed, after the defendants' respective motions for judgment

of acquittal were denied, the defendants rested.' They were then

convicted.68

Herein lies the problem. The court can readily deny a motion for a

judgment of acquittal. Upon this denial, the defendant is still left to

speculate and guess whether the government satisfied its burden-on the

government's evidence-of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. Thus, not knowing whether the government has discharged

its burden leaves the presumption of innocence and the defendant's

right to remain silent in competition with the government's

obligation to discharge its burden when, in fact, these three aims should

be cooperating with one another.

VI. Pass the Salt:

The International Tribunals-An Exercise

in Impermissible Burden Shifting

As a comparative study, consider that the proceedings before international

war crimes tribunals are bench trials." Although in a number of

instances the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was argued by

defense counsel on a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of

the government's case,70 the use of the legal sufficiency standard became

settled law. Unfortunately, this was without the benefit of any real

analysis.

The Appeals Chamber Judgement in Prosecutor v. Jelisid" is the

leading case among the international tribunals" for use of the legal

sufficiency standard in determining a motion for a judgment of

acquittal-known as Rule 98 biS73-at the close of the prosecution's

evidence.

The Appeals Chamber inJelisid followed74 its prior Appeals Chamber

Judgement in Prosecutor v. Delalid," which in turn cited the Appeals

Chamber Judgement in Prosecutor v. Tadie," the Appeals Chamber

Judgement in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,n and the Trial Chamber's

"Decision on Motion for Acquittal" in Prosecutor v. Kunara78 for

support.

However, those portions of Aleksovski and Tadid referred to by the

Delalid Appeals Chamber Judgement concern the standard of appellate

review in determining whether a trial chamber's factual finding can

withstand appellate scrutiny-that is, legal sufficiency.79 As such, Tadid

and Aleksovski are incorrectly cited by Delalid for the proposition that

the standard a trial court sitting without a jury should use to determine

a motion for a judgment of acquittal is also legal sufficiency."

The Trial Chamber's "Decision on Motion for Acquittal" in Prosecutor

v. Kunara6 held--citing the Trial Chamber's "Decision on Defence

Motions for Judgement of Acquittal" in Prosecutor v. Kordi8 '-that the

appropriate test to be applied on a motion for a judgment of acquittal

"was not whether there was evidence which satisfied the Trial Chamber

beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused (as the defence in

that case had argued), but rather it was whether there was evidence on

which a reasonable Trial Chamber could convict." 82

All things considered, the Trial Chamber in Kunaral did its best not

to impugn the prior jurisprudence on the issue. Thus, Kunarad, shifting

the burden of proof off the shoulders of the prosecution, noted-without

citing any authority-that

[i]f the Trial Chamber were entitled to weigh questions of credit generally

when determining whether a judgment of acquittal should be entered, and

if it found that such a judgment was not warranted, the perception would

necessarily be created (whether or not it is accurate) that the Trial Chamber

had accepted the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses as credible. Such

a consequence would then lead to two further perceptions: (1) that the

accused will bear at least an evidentiary onus to persuade the Trial Chamber

to alter its acceptance of the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, and

(2) that the accused will be convicted if he does not give evidence himself.

He would virtually be required to waive the right given to him by the

Tribunal's Statute to remain silent.83

An analysis ofKordi--the case spawning the seminal misunderstanding

of the proper application of a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the

international tribunals-is thus warranted.

First, the Trial Chamber in Kordid seemed satisfied that because other

trial chambers at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia were using a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt,

using a lower standard was the appropriate thing to do." Without any

analysis, the Trial Chamber indicated that "[i]mplicit in Rule 98 bis

proceedings is the distinction between the determination made at the

halfway stage of the trial, and the ultimate decision on the guilt of the

accused to be made at the end of the case, on the basis of proof beyond

a reasonable doubt."" The Trial Chamber failed to provide any basis or

reasoning for that distinction.

Next, the Kordid Trial Chamber looked to the Trial Chamber's

"Decision on Defence Motion to Dismiss Charges" in Prosecutor v.

Tadid," the Trial Chamber's "Order on the Motions to Dismiss the

Indictment at the Close of the Prosecutor's Case" in Prosecutor v.

Delali6," the Trial Chamber's "Decision of Trial Chamber I on the

Defence Motion to Dismiss" in Prosecutor v. Blaikid," and the Trial

Chamber's "Decision on Motion for Withdrawal ofthe Indictment against

the accused Vlatko Kupregki6" in Prosecutor v. Kupregkid."

The Trial Chamber in Tadid merely held-without citing any

authority-that, because it would ultimately determine whether each

count was proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the conclusion of the

entire case, it would only determine whether the evidence presented was

legally sufficient."o

In Delalid, the Trial Chamber held that a motion for judgment of

acquittal will be denied if, "as a matter of law, there is evidence before

it relating to each of the offences in question for the accused persons to

be invited to make their defence."9' There was no analysis as to the

foundations for this principle nor did this decision cite any jurisprudence.

After citing Tadi6 and Delalid, the Trial Chamber in Blakd.W held:

CONSIDERING that, on these legal foundations, based on a strict application

of the spirit and letter of the Rules, the Trial Chamber limits the review

of the Motion:

[1] in fact: to the mere hypothesis that the Prosecutor omitted to provide

the proof for one of its counts;

[2] in law: to the mere hypothesis that the Prosecution failed to show a

serious prima facie case in support of its claims.

That decision was made without any legal analysis as to the foundations

for this principle nor did the decision cite any jurisprudence for that

Holding.

Lastly, the Trial Chamber in Kupregkid merely referred to the test

enunciated in Tadid and dismissed the motion to withdraw the indictment

because the Trial Chamber was of the opinion that there was "evidence

as to each count charged in the indictment, which were it to be accepted

by [the] Trial Chamber, could [have] lawfully support[ed] [the] conviction.""

Other than referring to Tadi6, the Kupreikid Trial Chamber did

not provide any legal support for that standard.

Kordid then examined the practice in five domestic jurisdictions-

England and Wales,94 Canada," Australia," the United States, 97 and

Spain 9 8-and found "the test that is applied on motions for acquittal at

the end of the Prosecution's case is not the high standard of proof beyond

[a] reasonable doubt. 9 However, the practice referred to in England and

Wales, the United States, and Spain is in relation tojury trials, not bench

trials.'o As explained above, the low legal sufficiency standard is used

in jury trials because the judge is precluded from usurping the factfinder's

role. As such, the jury trial practice in these jurisdictions

provides Kordid no support. Next, Australian practice allows for ajudge

to acquit a defendant after the close of the prosecution's case'o' and is

in direct contradistinction to Kordid.

Finally, Canadian practice is the lone exception that does provide some

support for Kordid's proposition. However, in Canada-per statutory

requirement-the fact-finder can only render a verdict after the defendant

declares, after the prosecution's evidence, whether the defendant intends

to call a defense case (and upon such an affirmative declaration, after

hearing the defense evidence).102 Notably, there is no such requirement

in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the international tribunals nor

in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the United States. Consequently,

Kordid's citation to Canadian procedure does not support

Kordid's proposition.

Ultimately, what happened at the international level was that a meager

legal analysis emanating from the domestic practice in jury trials was

applied to the motion for a judgment of acquittal in non-jury trials. Of

course, the jurisprudence demonstrates worry that the court would usurp

thejury's function and, as such, would allow only for a court's determination

as to legal sufficiency on a motion for ajudgment of acquittal. This

led to a fundamental misunderstanding of how such a motion should be

decided in non-jury trials and a failure to recognize that it is impossible

for trial judges to usurp the fact-finder's function because the trial judges

themselves are the fact-finders.

Further propounding this misunderstanding was (1) the misapplication

of the standard of appellate review (as in Tadid and Aleksovski) as the

standard for a trial court's determination, (2) reliance on a "consistent

pattern" in the jurisprudence of solely a legal sufficiency standard

(although this pattern developed without any forethought),' and (3) a

demurrer to the trial chambers' ultimate responsibility of determining

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at the close of the trial. What remains

is a very low hurdle for the prosecution to meet for a motion for a

judgment of acquittal to be denied. Thus, "since the denial of such a

motion is, in no sense, an indication of the view of the Chamber as to the

guilt of the accused on any charge, little meaningful guidance is provided

to the accused in connection with his defence case.""

As highlighted in Kunara6, the jurisprudence implicitly prefers-in

attempts to avoid the twin perceptions that the accused has to persuade

the trial chamber "to alter its acceptance of the credibility of the prosecution's

witnesses" and that "the accused will be convicted if he does not

give evidence himself'-the defense to call a case instead of holding the

prosecution to its evidentiary burden of proving the defendant guilty. 05

It should be the opposite. The government should be held to its

burden. If, and only if, the government has satisfied its burden ofproving

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may then

choose to waive his right to silence. Indeed, if the trial chamber finds

that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the government

has discharged its burden.

VII. The Invitee: The Proposed Rule 29(e)-

"Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal,

Nonjury Trial"

To remedy the problems previously discussed, the author proposes

the following addition to Rule 29:

(e) Nonjury Trial. After the government closes its evidence, the

court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal

of any offense on the ground that the government did not prove that

the defendant is guilty of such offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Note, with this proposed rule, the defendant may-but is not required

to-make a motion for a judgment of acquittal. Further note that the

language in the proposed Rule 29(e) would require the court, upon such

a motion, to make a decision-without reservation-on the motion.

Of course, if acquitted on one or more counts, double jeopardy

attaches. If the bench indicates, upon decision of the motion, there will

be a conviction on one or more counts, the defendant may elect to call

a case and may elect to testify. The proposed rule does not include the

prospect for a defendant to make a motion at the conclusion of the

evidence.'o

Just Desserts: Conclusion

"[I]t may fairly be said, that, so soon as a man is arrested on a charge

of crime, the law takes the prisoner under its protection, and goes about

to see how his conviction may be prevented."' Elevating the standard

in determining a motion for a judgment of acquittal from prima facie to

beyond a reasonable doubt is the "forgotten" protection that a criminal

defendant deserves. Odd would be the prosecutor who would fuss about

elevating the standard. After all, the government bears the burden of

proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the

government cannot do so on its own evidence, the defendant must be not

guilty.

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法律论文优秀范文4

论房地产中介法律服务-法律论文-免费论文

论房地产中介法律服务

浅论对房地产中介服务违规行为的规制

 宁夏宁正律师事务所 姜有育

 [论文摘要]随着房地产行业的骤升，房地产中介服务机构越来越多。房地产中介服务活动的开展，促进了房地产交易专业化、规范化的发展，但由于起步晚、立法不健全，有些中介服务机构由于利益的驱动，存在许多违规操作的行为。本文拟从规范和调整中介服务行为入手，探讨中介服务违规行为的表现形式、形成原因等问题，并对中介服务违规行为的规制及立法提出相关建议，以加强立法和监管机制，严格市场准入，确立责任保险制度，保障房地产中介服务业健康、有序的发展。

[关键词] 房地产 中介服务 违规行为 规制

 目 录

一、 房地产中介违规行为的主要表现形式………………………… 第3页

（一）对不允许上市交易的房地产违规代理、挂牌出售……………第3页

（二）疏于核查客户、房屋的关键信息………………………………第3页

（三）隐瞒影响交易成功的重要信息…………………………………第3页

（四）为交易双方规避法律出谋划策…………………………………第3页

（五）违规获取额外利益………………………………………………第4页

（六）资金监管存在漏洞………………………………………………第4页

二、 房地产中介违规行为成因分析………………………………… 第4页

（一）立法层级低、缺乏可操作性，致使规制房地产中介难以做到有法可依…………………………………… 第4页

（二）市场准入门槛太低，人员素质普遍不高。………………… 第4页（三）监督检查执行不到位，也是问题突出、屡禁不止的重要原因 第5页

三、规制房地产中介违规行为的几点建议……………………………第5页（一）严格市场准入并建立等级评定制………………………………第5页（二）设立行业协会……………………………………………………第5页（三）确立过错归责原则和中介机构的免责事由……………………第5页（四）建立中介行业保证金制度和责任保险制度……………………第6页

（五）定期组织培训和考核，提高中介机构和人员素质……………第6页

浅论对房地产中介服务违规行为的规制

近几年来，随着房地产行业的不断升温，房地产市场空前活跃，房地产中介服务机构如雨后春笋般纷纷涌现。一方面，中介机构为房地产交易的供求双方起到了媒介和桥梁的作用，促进了房地产交易的专业化、规范化运作；另一方面，由于我国房地产中介服务起步较晚，立法也不够健全，房地产中介服务行为混乱无序，侵害当事人权益、欺诈消费者事件时有发生。鉴于此，迅速规范房地产中介行为、平衡当事人之间的利益，已成为我国立法必须面对的迫切问题。本文拟从规范和调整中介行为入手，探讨中介违规行为的表现形式、形成原因等问题，并对中介违规行为的规制及立法提出相关建议。

一、 房地产中介违规行为的主要表现形式

根据《城市房地产管理法》及《城市房地产中介服务管理规定》的有关规定，所谓房地产中介服务，是指房地产咨询、房地产价格评估、房地产经纪等活动的总称。房地产中介服务违规行为，是指房地产中介服务机构和人员违反相关法律、法规的规定，故意或过失操作房地产咨询、价格评估和经纪等中介服务活动，扰乱房地产交易市场的正常秩序，损害房地产交易各方当事人合法权益的行为。其主要表现形式为：

（一）对不允许上市交易的房地产违规代理、挂牌出售。

根据我国《城市房地产管理法》第38条的规定，对于未依法登记领取权属证书的或具有法律和行政法规规定禁止转让的房地产不得转让。但在实践中，一些房地产中介为了促成交易，赚取佣金，往往隐瞒标的房屋仍为承租公房或为限制年限内的经济适用住房等不能上市交易的事实，或随意承诺短期内即可解决交易障碍，致使买卖双方在随后交易失败后与房地产中介公司就中介费应否支付产生纷争。

（二）疏于核查客户、房屋的关键信息。

如中介公司未对客户出示的身份证明、房屋权属证明进行合理查验；未仔细审查待售房屋有无抵押、有无出租及私搭乱建，并核查委托的客户是否是真正有权出售房屋的权利人；对于属于夫妻共有财产的房屋，未要求配偶一方出具同意出售和委托办理的证明；对于待出售房屋为遗产的，未要求全体遗产继承人出具同意出售的书面委托文件。

（三）隐瞒影响交易成功的重要信息。

如不向买受人如实说明其已知的可能不利于成交的待售房屋的历史情况或周边环境或必要生活设施情况。

（四）为交易双方规避法律出谋划策。

如承诺为无实力购房人办理“高评低供”还贷款手续，或帮助外地买受人虚构在京纳税或社保缴费一年以上证明，或为迎合买受人少交税款的心理帮助买卖双方签订“阴阳合同”，恶意促成双方达成不平等或不合法交易。

（五）违规获取额外利益。

如中介公司要求买受人全程通过其交纳钱款、委托办理过户，从而千方百计阻挠买受人与出卖人见面，再通过隐瞒房屋真实成交价、一再加价等手段将多收取的售房款据为己有。又如中介公司怂恿当事人采取恶意毁约、一房二卖的方式高价出售房产以为自身获取更高的居间服务费，从而引发房屋买卖连环纠纷。

（六）资金监管存在漏洞。

大部分交易中，买卖合同约定的定金和首付款由中介公司自行监管，有的交易总价较高，定金和首付款的总和可能高达几十万元，这大大增加了交易风险；一些银行只对在该银行贷款的购房客户实行免费资金监管，而对于不在该银行贷款的购房客户不提供资金监管服务或收取高额的监管服务费用，导致购房客户不愿或无法选择由第三方办理资金监管。

二、 房地产中介违规行为成因分析

（一）立法层级低、缺乏可操作性，致使规制房地产中介难以做到有法可依。

在国家立法层面，目前我国尚无专门的房地产中介管理立法，仅有的几个条文只散见于《城市房地产管理法》第58条(有关房地产中介服务机构的设立条件)及《合同法》第23章(有关居间合同的一般规定)中，并不足以起到规范现实生活中复杂多样的房地产中介行为的作用。而建设部颁布的《城市房地产中介服务管理规定》、国家工商总局颁布的《经纪人管理办法》、国家计委和建设部联合发布的《关于房地产中介服务收费的通知》及建设部和财政部等七部委联合下发的《关于整顿和规范房地产市场秩序的通知》等均属于部委规章和文件，难以被法院直接引用，这就在一定程度上弱化了法律对市场的宣示功能，并助长了房地产中介机构漠视法规、不时突破甚至违法乱纪的行为。

 

而且，有关房地产中介方面的管理规范多系指引性和框架性的规定，缺乏一些必要的明确指引和具体要求。如在房地产中介机构的设立条件上，无论是《城市房地产管理法》还是《城市房地产中介服务管理规定》均只要求有必要的财产和经费，但何为“必要”却未进一步规定，这就意味着只要符合《公司法》规定的下限即人民币10万元即可登记注册一家房地产经纪公司，无疑这样的条件设计对于经手大量交易、可能会给客户造成巨大经济损失的房地产中介企业而言未免过于宽泛了。

（二）市场准入门槛太低，人员素质普遍不高。

我国房地产从业人员的执业准入也相当宽松，不仅学历要求低，而且考试也简单，造成房地产中介从业人员良莠不齐，缺乏必要的敬业精神和职业道德素养，埋下了诸多隐患。

（三）监督检查执行不到位，也是问题突出、屡禁不止的重要原因。

根据《经纪人管理办法》第18条的规定，对经纪人的违法活动，工商行政管理机关有权按照有关法律法规及行政规章予以处罚。但事实上，每年房地产中介虽然占据经纪类投诉的首位，却鲜见有职能机关监督检查、处罚违规中介的报道。

在美国，由私人推动组建有贯通上下的全美房地产经纪人协会、州协会和市协会这样一套金字塔状、网络化的格局建制，如入会会员有任何违纪行为，协会即有权吊销其相应资格甚至对其提起诉讼。但在我国，目前并未建立起全国性的房地产经纪协会组织，一些地方也尚未组建区域性的房地产经纪协会，已经建立的地区性经纪协会在会员数量、服务培训、管理手段上均表现得相当疲软。

三、规制房地产中介违规行为的几点建议

要解决房地产中介违规行为带来的诸多问题，唯一标本兼治的办法就是加强和完善立法。建议立法应确立以下几方面内容：

（一）严格市场准入并建立等级评定制。

国外对房地产中介机构及其执业人员一般都实行严格的准入制度，如美国的执照制度和我国香港地区的发牌制度，都严格限制入市机构和人员的标准和条件。近几年，我国虽然也实行中介机构资质及执业人员资格管理制度，但由于标准及条件规定偏宽，且监管机构把关不严，导致大量的低素质机构及执业人员进入市场。为此，我国要通过立法对从业机构和人员分别实行严格的准入标准，建立中介公司等级评定制，推动中介市场优胜劣汰，并为购房者提供区分良莠的依据。

（二）设立行业协会

许多发达国家和地区都建立了房地产中介行业协会，并通过行业协会制订了执业道德规范，对中介违规行为加以规范和限制。行业协会可配合政府有关部门对不正当的中介行为进行处罚，如在本行业内部公告严重违规或严重缺乏资信的中介机构或人员名单，禁止其在一定期限内重新执业以及开除出协会等等。

（三）确立过错归责原则和中介机构的免责事由

过错责任是指因行为过错导致他人损害时应承担的责任。根据客观过错说，行为人的行为只要违反了法律所设定的规则、义务，那么即存在过错。在房地产中介服务中，中介机构从事违规行为一般都出于过错和重大过失。鉴于中介违规行为的特殊性，为避免诉讼中受害方对中介机构的主观过错举证困难，应适用过错推定原则，实行举证倒置。只要中介服务给当事人带来损失，当事人就可以起诉中介机构，中介机构必须提供证据证明自己主观无过错或过失，否则就应当推定其有过错，应当对受害方的损害承担责任。

（四）建立中介行业保证金制度和责任保险制度。

为防止中介机构及从业人员挪用客户资金或携款潜逃，相关主管部门应推动建立中介行业保证金制度和责任保险制度，以保障整个房产中介行业的良性发展。保证金指房地产中介机构缴纳，用于保障房地产中介行业中消费者权益的专用款项。也可以借鉴我国旅游业明确规定的旅行社质量保证金制度，建立房地产中介行业的保证金制度。设置房地产中介行业责任险，使作为被保险人的房地产中介机构在承办房屋中介业务过程中因过失给委托人及其利害关系人造成的损失，可由保险公司在赔偿限额内负责赔偿，这有利于保障安全交易和当事人的合法权益。

（五）定期组织培训和考核，提高中介机构和人员素质。负责监管房地产中介机构的行政部门应定期组织培训，及时传达有关房地产中介行为操作规范的法律法规，通报具有违规行为的中介机构和业务人员以及采取的处罚措施，以起到警诫作用，从而树立中介机构和个人的诚信意识。同时，还应加强对中介机构高层的培训，树立中介机构的危机意识，引导中介机构从无序扩张、寅吃卯粮的发展状态逐渐向理性判断市场走势、维护市场稳定健康发展的方向发展

 

  

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浅谈基层法律援助网络建设与完善-法律论文-免费论文

浅谈基层法律援助网络建设与完善

浅谈基层法律援助网络建设与完善

高唐县法律援助中心

作为一名多年来从事基层一线的法律援助工作者，通过多年的工作实践，在认识到当前农村法律援助工作的重要性以外，也更清醒的认识到基层法律援助网络建设的完善是做好农村法律援助工作的重要前提。针对这一认识，浅淡如下。

我国法律援助的对象主要是生活比较贫困的群众和一些特殊社会群体，我国是个农业大国，有近80%的的公民都生活在农村，农村的经济发展远远落后于城市，农村的生活水平和农民的人均收入都是比较低的，经济的落后使得教育水平无法提高，从而导致农民整体的科学文化素质和精神道德素质不高。所以法律援助工作的重心应该放在农村，而针对有80%量的农民国情来说，单单靠法律援助中心以及律师的力量是微乎其微的，所以必须要加强部门联动，建立起社会共同参与的法律援助工作格局，才会尽最大可能地完成法律援助最初所设立的目的。而就现实基层网络建设中还存在着很多问题。

首先，就拿我县而言，自2000年开始，就开始联合老龄委、妇联、残联等部门成立了法律援助联络站，2001年在全县各乡镇也建立起法律援助联络站，并先后与民政、工会、共青团、劳动等部门联络成立了法律援助联络站，可以说网络建设这一块已经十分完善，并且这一网络在为社会稳定、政府依法行政也作出了积极贡献。但政府只在有有问题时想起了法律援助，而法律援助做为政府的一个责任，在法律援助运作的体系与管理上还没有体现政府的重视，还没有推动法律援助工作的积极举措，这必然导致法律援助在政府实际工作中不能得到有效的贯彻和落实，也必然导致依托部门、依托乡镇、村（居）委、社区设立的法律援助站联络站难以有效发挥职能作用，甚至形同虚设。

其次，部门形成合力是基层法律援助网络亟待解决的问题。仍以我县举例，我县基层法律援助网络覆盖面非常广大，但在实践操作中缺乏一个统一管理，统一调度的体系和体制。虽然我们在最初也设立了由政府主要分管领导、各部门领导组成的法律援助委员会，但法律援助却往往会因为每一届政府重视的不同程度而有着不同的待遇，法律援助中心本身是隶属于县司法局的二级半机构，对各部门单位和相关人员没有管理、考核、监督的职能和权力。所以，法律援助工作通常是司法行政部门唱“独角戏”，经常是催着政府动，喊着部门来，牵着站点走。例如：在日常的工作中，有些部门联络站为了推诿责任，口头打发咨询人、申请人、信访人来找法律援助，而根本不仔细审查是否属于法律援助范围，是否属于涉诉涉法事项，这也无疑又加重了法律援助中心的另一负担。所以就如何使这一社会力量形成合力，发挥更大的作用，还有待于一些制度和政策的出台，而单靠某个县或某个地区中心争取是办不到的。即使办的到，也不可能是长期性的。

第三，基层法律援助联络站的联络人员就目前来讲全是兼职，就文化程度来说，现在基本都是大专以上，而再要求是法律专业人士就显的非常苛刻了，就现在基层司法所来说，本身人员就少，但牌子不少，矛盾纠纷调处中心、人民调解委员会、社会矛盾调处中心、法律援助工作站等也都设在他们那里，他们在承担自身职责的同时，大部分还都承担着各乡镇所指派的任务。特别是人民调解委员会和法律援助工作站同设于司法所，就很难理顺两者的关系，也很难把握居中调解和代理一方权益的角色，所以很难实现两者价值取向的统一。再如联络点的人员是由村、社区的人民调解员担任，别说是法律专业人员，就是其文化程度能达到高中的就是很不错的了。所以在业务工作中就很容易存在这样那样的弊端。所以大部分的工作还是中心来完成，他们只是起到一个地熟、人熟，可以容易沟通的作用。有的遇到受援问题，干脆直接告诉受援人说去找法律援助中心。

基于以上实践分析，笔者认为应从以下几点来改善目前基层网络建设的现状。

一、 完善法律援助机制，加强政府责任的落实。

《法律援助条例》第三条规定：“法律援助是政府责任，县级以上人民政府应当采取积极措施推动法律援助工作，为法律援助提供财政支持，保障法律援助事业与经济、社会协调发展”。只有在政府的统领之下，才能引起各相关单位的重视，才能有效地联动现有的法律援助网络。首先要成立一个法律援助协调议事机构。其次，政府要完善法律援助地方规章，规范和研究推进法律援助发展的措施和办法。第三要将法律援助工作列入各级党委、政府为民办实事的目标管理考核内容，建立考评监督机制，同时将任务分解细化，量化到各相关单位。第四是上级政府和行业主管部门应给予政策指导，加强目标管理，有效地落实基层政府责任。第五是在原来办案补贴预算外，还应提供法律援助网络建设的硬件、软件配置经费和日常工作经费保障。

二、理顺管理体系，体现法律援助的权威性。

各级法律援助机构代表政府履行职责，同时承担管理和服务双重职能，目前法律援助机构的定性还不明确，有的地方是行政单位，有的地方是事业单位，有的地方仍是属于司法行政机关内部的一个科室。这也就导致法律援助机构对外缺乏权威性。因此，理顺管理体制有利于法律援助机构名正言顺地开展工作。明确法律援助工作的领导管理、组织实施和业务指导职责，赋予其与管理对应的职权。同时，将法律援助机构就行政与事业进行统一定性。

三、培训适格人才，保障法律援助职能运行。

经了解，最近几年，各县市在基层法律援助网络建设上都非常重视，在县、乡、村以及各部门之间都形成了纵横交错的网络体系。而其作用之所以发挥不充分，主要还是人员不专问题。比如现在很多地方基层司法所都已垂直管理，完全可以在司法所内部配备一至二名法律援助专门人员。具体负责辖区内法律援助申请的初审、提供法律咨询、联系受援对象、参加符合法律援助条件的人民调解。

在残联、妇联等相关部门则可以实行联络制度，由相关部门自行配备专职人员进行负责，对遇有法律援助事项的可以及时与法律援助机构进行联络，做好受援对象的交接受理工作。

在公安、检察、法院中，可以利用建立联系制度和定期召开联系会议等方式开展工作，比如在公安、检察阶段提前介入，诉前调解。总之，利用一切可以利用的资源，实现“应援尽援”的目标。

同时，鉴于当前从事法律服务的人员无法满足受援需求的情况，积极鼓励社会力量参与法律援助有利于弥补现有法律援助人员专业素质偏底、工作热情和工作积极性不高和工作效率低下等等不足。为社会组织和志愿者主动参与法律援助工作搭建一个平台，要充分调动社会组织参与法律援助的积极性，充分利用社会组织和志愿者的力量募集资金，补充财政资金的困难和不足。

总上所述，法律援助网络的建设和完善应是当前基层法律援助工作的重点，只有充分发挥好法律援助网络这一强大作用，法律援助职能才能更有效地发挥。

 

  

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未成年人抚养费纠纷案件的特点、问题及对策-法律论文-免费论文

未成年人抚养费纠纷案件的特点、问题及对策

未成年人抚养费纠纷案件的特点、问题及对策

法院未成年人案件调研报告

区人民法院

近年来，随着经济的发展、文化观念以及生活方式的转变，我国的离婚率一直处于高位态势，导致大量离异家庭未成年子女的出现，离异家庭未成年子女由于年龄较小，欠缺劳动能力，必然对抚养费有高度的依赖性，使得因各种原因诉至人民法院的抚养费纠纷案件日益增多。为了更好的保护未成年民事当事人的合法权益，本文从我院2012年审理的抚养费纠纷案件入手，查找问题并提出初步建议，以期对预防和解决好此类纠纷有所裨益。

一、抚养费纠纷案件基本情况及特点

2012年，***区法院共审结抚养费纠纷案件21件，占同期婚姻家庭案件审结数的2.40%，数量上比去年同期上升了23.5%。这些案件主要具有以下特点：

1．绝大多数是婚生子女抚养费纠纷。审结的21件案件中，20件是婚生子女抚养纠纷，占已结案件的95%，只有1件是非婚生子女抚养费纠纷。

2．多因拖欠抚养费、要求增加抚养费而提起。审结的21件案件中，拖欠抚养费的有14件，占已结案件的66.7%。要求增加抚养费的有11件，占已结案件的52.4%，且有4件案件属于第二次起诉要求增加抚养费数额。（见附表一）

附表一：抚养费纠纷案件诉讼请求类型

诉讼请求

案件数

比重

支付拖欠的抚养费并要求增加抚养费数额

9

42.9%

要求对方支付拖欠的抚养费

5

23.8%

要求对方承担抚养费

4

19.0%

增加抚养费数额

2

9.5%

要求减少抚养费数额

1

4.8%

合计

21

100%

3．超七成是女方抚养子女，不履行抚养义务的男方多。审结的21件案件中，女方抚养子女的16件，占已结案件的71.4%，男方抚养子女的6件，占已结案件的28.6%。拖欠抚养费的14件案件中，父亲不履行抚养义务的有9件，占该类案件的64.3%，母亲不履行抚养义务的有5件，占该类案件的35.7%。

4．婚生子女抚养费纠纷的离婚方式多为协议离婚、调解离婚。20件婚生子女抚养费纠纷中，只有2件是判决离婚，仅占10%，在民政局协议婚的有13件，占65%，法院主持下调解离婚的有5件，占25%。（见附表二）即90%的案件当初拟定的关于抚养费的协议都是双方协商同意的，因在履行过程中发生分歧又不能协商从而诉至法院。

附表二：抚养费纠纷案件的离婚方式

5．未成年子女抚养费的履行情况较差。审结的21件案件中，有抚养费协议的17件，仅有3件能得到及时、足额的履行，占17.6%。拖欠抚养费的14件案件中，最短的欠6个月，拖欠20个月以上的有10件，拖欠时间最长的长达12年半。（见附表三）

附表三：抚养费履行情况

序号

离婚方式

离婚时长

协议内容

履行情况

1

协议

9年

 

05年法院调解达成新协议：200元/月

拖欠21个月

2

协议

11年

200元/月

拖欠135个月

3

协议

10年

50元/月

拖欠23个月

4

判决

8年

08年法院判决增加为200元/月

拖欠36个月

5

协议

5年

200元/月

拖欠27个月

6

协议

7年

08年经法院调解增加为160元/月

能履行

7

协议

3年

2011年9月法院判决变更抚养，300元/月

拖欠12个月

8

协议

8年

100元/月

一直未付，拖欠8年

9

调解

13年

500元/月

拖欠12年半

10

判决

5年

2011年变更抚养关系，300元/月

拖欠6个月

11

调解

4年

300元/月

能履行

12

协议

1年

500元/月

能履行

13

协议

2年半

500元/月

一直未付，拖欠32个月

14

调解

10年

150元/月，09年法院调解

增加为300元/月

02年由法院强制从对方工资卡上扣划，09年调解新达成的数额没有履行，拖欠36个月

15

协议

1年

1000元/月

拖欠11个月

16

调解

3年

不明

未履行抚养义务，要求一次性支付抚养费

17

协议

3年半

300元/月

从未履行，拖欠42个月

6．案件调解、撤诉率保持高位状态。审结的21件案件中，判决结案4件，占19%；调解、撤诉17件，占81%，可见，调解和撤诉是抚养费纠纷案件的重要结案方式。

7．抚养费数额最高与最低之间的差距加大。从审结的21件案件来看，因为离婚时间长短不同，不同案件间抚养人的收入差距，支付能力大小的不同，以及生活的区域不同，所需费用不同，从而造成不同案件中主张或协议的抚养费最高数额与最低数额之间的差距加大。抚养费最高的每月达4166元，离婚时间比较长的且生活在农村的每月支付抚养费多在一、两百元间，最低的仅50元，相差达82倍。

二、抚养费案件审判过程中发现的问题

（一）责任意识和诚信观念缺失

抚养子女是父母的法定义务，为人父母，就有责任和义务对子女进行抚养和教育，这种责任和义务不因离婚而解除。父母离异本身对于未成年子女就是一种重创和打击，处于单亲家庭的孩子对抚养费就会格外依赖，因此按时足额地支付抚养费是离异父母的基本义务，也是为人父母应坚守的道德底线。但是近年来，自愿达成的抚养协议得不到很好的履行，彰显了不少的离异父母缺乏应有的责任感和诚信观。审理中，有三名被告是辖区内大型国有企业、效益较好的事业单位的正式职工，完全有足够的履行能力，但仍然为孩子的抚养费问题对簿公堂，甚至有一起双方当事人都是同一大型国有企业职工，几经派出所、居委会、单位领导调解都没有得到解决的抚养费纠纷案件。

（二）思想观念和认识上存在误区

一个误区是混同夫妻共同财产的分割与抚养费的给付，因为夫妻共同财产的分割与履行抚养义务是两个法律概念。实践中夫妻双方离婚时一方只是单纯放弃共同财产，未明确约定将放弃的财产折抵抚养费，事后又以子女名义主张抚养费，法院一般会支持子女的主张，但另一方会觉得特别“冤”，在履行时也是消极被动，纷争不断。另一个误区是认为没有抚养能力就可以不履行抚养义务。我院辖区内不少当事人一方或双方没有稳定的工作，农民以及外出务工人员较多，收入不稳定，如果在离婚后组建新家庭后家庭负担加重，这些都成为他们不履行抚养义务的抗辩理由。

（三）缺少对夫妻离婚协议的主动审查机制

《婚姻登记条例》第十三条规定赋予婚姻登记机关的审查权仅仅是形式审查，并不审查实质内容。而且，作为“离婚”这个具有重要的人身法律关系的民事行为，婚姻登记机关仅仅将男女双方作为当事人，把离婚放在了第一位，割裂了离婚和抚养问题，并没有将未成年子女作为有利害关系的第三人来考虑其合法权益。对于双方自愿达成的涵盖对子女抚养费内容的离婚协议，法律尊重意思自治，法院也不会主动对离婚协议的内容进行实质性的审查，只有在双方不能达成一致的情况下法院才会作出判决。

（四）相关法律规定界定不明

根据最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国婚姻法》若干问题的解释（一）第二十条规定：“婚姻法第21条所称‘抚养费’，包括子女生活费、教育费、医疗费等费用。”按照现行法律规定，不再区分生活费、教育费和医疗费，而是综合确定一个抚养费数额。起诉要求增加抚养费的案件中，除了因收入增加、物价上涨的因素外，多以孩子教育费、医疗费支出过高作为理由，新达成的调解协议或法院判决不少都要求“教育费用、医疗费用以票据为准各承担50%”，即在实践中的抚养费多指生活费和一般意义上的医疗费用。但是因目前没有相关规定对必要学习费用进行界定，双方当事人之间也没有对此达成一个合意，因此有可能在“教育费用”问题上再次引起争端，因为社会上各种补习班、特长班比比皆是，费用不菲，报多报少，选此择彼在费用上会有很大差异。

三、解决抚养费纠纷的对策及建议

（一）加大对离婚协议中关于子女抚养约定的审查力度

为了有效保护离婚协议中未成年子女的合法权益，有必要借鉴其他国家在这方面的做法，要求法院承担起主动审查的职责，审查父母在离婚时就子女抚养费达成的协议是否有损未成年子女的合法权益，能否得到有效的执行，否则应不予支持，并要求双方重新约定。

（二）主动做好抚养费纠纷案件的法律释明

1．对当事人认识观念上的误区进行法律释明：夫妻共同财产的分配与抚养费的折抵虽然是两个不同的法律关系，但是抚养费问题可以在离婚协议中与财产问题一并解决，即在离婚时可以明确约定以一方应得的共同财产折抵其应付的抚养费，双方分割共同财产后，这样不直接抚养子女的一方才通常不再需要另行支付抚养费。对于错误理解没有抚养能力就不承担抚养责任的当事人，应明确告知我国的法律规定，抚养子女是父母的法定义务，作为父母只要具有劳动能力，就应该通过自己的劳动获得收入，承担起抚养子女的责任。抚养能力是个综合衡量的标准，不能仅以短暂的失业或负担加重就认定不具备抚养能力，免除其抚养义务。

2．对于抚养费的内容及数额进行法律释明：我国现行法律规定的抚养费包括子女生活费、教育费、医疗费等费用，是一个综合确定的数额，包括的教育费和医疗费是指一般意义上的，如发生了较大数额的医疗、教育费用可以另行起诉。允许双方约定在抚养费之外额外分担医疗、教育费，但是抚养费的数额，应以子女的实际需要、父母双方的负担能力和当地的实际生活水平来确定，其内容并非包括子女的所有花销。子女的生活水平及受教育的条件，应以满足子女的实际需要并以双方现有的经济条件为限。

（三）不断延伸审判职能，加大 力度

在做好常规 工作的同时，针对实践中人们关于未成年子女抚养问题认识观念上的误区等印发法律宣传单，在民政部门离婚办理窗口发放，以提高 的针对性。对于有未成年子女，需要在协议中一并解决抚养问题的，要对当事人进行宣传讲解相关规定，让当事人进一步明确抚养义务的强制性，促使其完善离婚协议中关于未成年子女抚养的约定，并积极自觉履行抚养义务。

（四）完善抚养费给付制度，建立社会保障机制

1．探索建立抚养给付数额的灵活调整机制。我院审结的抚养费纠纷案件中有4件，占近两成的案件已经是为增加抚养费数额第二次起诉，均因随着物价上涨，生活水平的提高，固定数额的抚养费已经不能满足生活需要，应该探索建立随着父母收入变化而灵活增加的抚养费制度。这种调整宜以两年为限，定期调整，父母有固定收入的参照父母的收入，父母没有固定收入的，可以参照当地居民平均收入水平。对于增加的数额，可以由双方协商，协商不成的也可以由法院确定。

2．探索建立“一次性给付”的第三方保障机制。法律规定的抚养费给付方式实行的是“定期给付”和“一次性给付”并行制，但实践中多以“定期给付”为主，这不乏对“一次性给付”难以保障未成年子女的担心。在父母一方有经济条件时一次性给付抚养费，或预付抚养费后，可以由法院或银行等第三方机构建立专用账户等形式，加强对抚养费用的监管，以利于保障未成年人的生活、成长不受父母经济条件变化

的较大影响。

3．建立健全未成年子女抚养费无法到位的社会救助制度。我院有2件抚养费纠纷案件，因被告患病、遭遇严重车祸而没有抚养能力，原告不得不撤诉，像这种由于当事人生活困难、无力支付抚养费的情况还不少。这种情况下，政府应承担起保障困难家庭未成年子女生活和学习的责任，建立健全社会救助制度，明确救助范围包括生活救助、医疗救助、教育救助、急难救助、灾害救助等，救助办法有发放救助金或提供免费服务等方式。

 

  

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试论罪刑法定原则的必要性及其在我国刑事立法和刑事司法中的贯彻与完善-法律论文-免费论文

试论罪刑法定原则的必要性及其在我国刑事立法和刑事司法中的贯彻与完善

罪刑法定原则亦称罪刑法定主义，是指认定什么行为是犯罪，对犯什么罪应处以何种刑罚，都由刑法明文加以规定，无明文规定的就不能处以刑罚。这一原则的提出是刑事法治的一大进步，它在刑事立法和刑事司法中具有十分重要的意义，发挥着重要作用。

一、对罪刑法定原则的理解及其必要性

我国《刑法》规定，法律明文规定为犯罪行为的，依照法律定罪处刑；法律没有明文规定为犯罪行为的，不得定罪量刑。可以看出罪刑法定的内容有两个方面，一方面是只有法律将某一种行为明文规定为犯罪的，才能对这种行为定罪判刑，而且必须依照法律的规定定罪判刑。另一方面，凡是法律对某一种行为没有规定为犯罪的，对这种行为就不能定罪判刑。

由此我们可以对这一原则作如下理解。一是明确性原则。法律应该明确具体规定哪些行为成罪当罚，该定何罪，受到何种处罚。二是法律不溯及既往。从法律溯及力来看，新法优于旧法，轻法优于重法，特别法优于一般法。从法律追诉时效的角度来讲，一旦经过追诉时效，此行为也不受刑法追究。三是禁止类推。类推作为特殊时期的产物，曾在一段时期内发挥了一定的作用，但类推的适用增加了法的不确定性，使定罪量刑处于不明确状态中，有违刑法理念和罪刑法定精神。四是司法解释不能超越法律。五是禁止不定之刑。法即无明文规定为罪，则行为人不受刑，这是罪刑一致的要求。

罪刑法定原则的提出，不仅有着深刻的历史政治背景，而且也有着坚实的理论基础。从古老文明到现代法治，从学术到法律，它发挥了巨大作用，尤其在现代法制社会显得尤为必要。

一是反对封建社会罪刑擅断斗争的必然要求。无论是古代的西方还是东方，凡是在实行专制的社会中，君主大权独揽，集立法、司法与行政大权于一身，实行的是罪刑擅断。君主掌握着生杀大权，刑法被作为维护封建专制统治的工具。当人类资本主义文明时，为防止审判中的罪刑擅断，才有必要把罪与刑明文规定下来，从而确定了罪刑法定原则，因此它对防止立法权和司法权的滥用起到了重大作用。

二是现代法制社会司法独立的必然要求。立法和司法独立见诸于西方的“三权分立”学术观点，从法国启蒙思想到西方“三权分立”的最终确立，罪刑法定作为司法独立的重要原则，也就成了刑法法治的精神和理念。现在，无论是在资本主义国家还是社会主义国家，法治已成时代的要求，作为法治的重要方面也就成为必然。

三是充分保护社会公平和法益的必然要求。法律是社会公平正义的天平。罪刑法定就是要用安定明确的法律规定定罪量刑，法的目的具体于刑法上就是保护法益，包括行为人的自由。要用法定刑对法定罪，实现罪刑相一致，实现刑法的公平正义的价值理念。

四是尊重和保障人权的必然要求。罪刑法定原则与尊重和保障人权是血脉相连的，罪刑法定原则是尊重和保障人权的法治原则在刑法中的具体体现，而后者是前者的基础。罪刑法定原则的诞生，正是为了防止擅断，保障人权。对人权的尊重反映了社会文明发展程度的高低。因此，树立人权神圣的理念，推进刑事法治化，真正确立罪刑法定原则，对内更有利于保护公民的合法权益，对外也更能体现我国保护人权的形象。如财产型的犯罪中，刑法就是要以通过罪刑法定，既维护国家、社会和他人的财产利益，同时也要保护犯罪人的权益，使法律的天平始终衡平。

二、罪刑法定在刑事立法中的体现

刑事立法是将刑法的理念与将来可能发生的事实相对应，形成刑法规范。在经济发展的复杂社会和重视人权的法治时代，不可能直接根据刑法的理念定罪量刑，所以刑法理念必须具体化、实证化、明确化，真正做到有法可依、有法必依，依法必须遵循法治理念的精神。

从我国刑法对犯罪与刑罚的具体规定来看，罪刑法定原则在我国刑事法治中也得到了一定的体现。一是罪之法定。作为罪刑法定的根本要求之一，我国刑法第13条对犯罪概念作了明确回答，为罪与非罪划分了界线，制定了罪的标准。这一定义强调了行为的社会危害性和犯罪的本质特征，使社会危害性在刑法规范中得到明确具体的反映。同时又将社会危害性的行为规定为违反刑法的行为，成为社会主义法治的必然要求。刑法也规定犯罪构成的要件，为区别罪与非罪、此罪与彼罪提供了依据，划分了界线，为罪与非罪、此罪与彼罪提供了一般的标准。刑法的总则部分还明确了犯罪人的刑事年龄等问题。分则部分对各种罪刑也作了明确规定，司法人员在追究犯罪行为中，只能以刑法为准绳。从而实现了罪之法定。

二是刑之法定。只有罪没有刑，且定罪依法而量刑没有法定，则不能很好的理解和贯彻这一原则。新的刑法典一是规定了刑罚种类，而且对适用其一刑种的适用条件作了限制规定。尤其是最近全国人大的第六次刑法修正案更是对死刑作了的限制规定，死刑的核准权统一上收，程序也将更严格，体现了严格的罪刑法定原则。二是对量刑的原则进行规定。对犯罪行为的量刑将严格的依照刑法所规定的犯罪事实、情节、性质、后果等各方面进行，司法人员可以依法进行裁量，但不能超过刑法原则所要求的限度。三是明确了犯罪的法定刑。严格限制法官的自由裁量权，法官在法律规定的刑种限度内确定最终的刑罚。由上可以看出，罪刑法定原则在我国刑事立法中得到了很好的体现。

三、罪刑法定在刑事司法中的贯彻及完善

罪刑法定是我国刑法确定的基本原则，该原则的确立对保障人权，维护法制起了重要作用。但是在刑事司法实践中，由于种种原因，罪刑法定原则的贯彻还存在诸多问题。法无明文规定不为罪，法无明文规定不量刑，然而在司法实践中仍然存在罪不明确但却受刑或为罪不量刑的情况，破坏了法律应有的正义公平的价值理念。二是类推的适用使法与罪具有不明确性。三是法官自由裁量过大或过滥而使司法解释具有随意性，甚至存在违背立法精神的情况。

罪刑法定就是在定罪量刑时，既要考虑刑法的目的和价值，既要以分则为依据，也要根据总则规定，只有结合二者才能作出合法合理的裁量。为此，在刑事立法和司法中要做到以下几个方面：

一要增强刑法的明确性。不能将刑法的“明文规定”等同于“明确规定”。罪刑法定原则要求刑事立法对于犯罪构成要件和法定刑及其适用条件都必须明文规定。明文规定的目的在于保证刑法的稳定性，以对司法裁判予以约束。要实现罪责一致，还必须明确“情节严重”、“危害性较大”等法律用语，使法官裁量不至于随意。

二要增强立法的前瞻性。任何法律都是对现实生活的一种规束，这要求它既要符合现实，又要具有一定的超前性和预见性。当然，由于社会发展太快，同时由于立法水平和技术上的原因，法律不可能涵盖所有的情况，但是法律需要一定的前瞻性，用于引导刑法发展的未来趋势。坚决废除司法裁量类推制度，完全实现罪疑从无、无罪推定。

三要增强司法解释的准确性。解释者必须心存刑法理念，运用各种解释方法和手段，既要作出合乎立法本意的解释，使解释具有一定的灵活性、开放性，还要使解释具有一定的可操作性。当出现立法模糊时，应将有利于被告作为刑法解释争议的最高标准。

当然，罪刑法定原则作为法治的精神和要求，也需要我们在贯彻这一原则时，不能仅强调实质上的合理，只追求实体正义，还要追求形式上的合理，实现程序正义。只有将程序正义和实体正义结合起来，才能更好地理解和贯彻这一原则，在刑事法治中做得更好。

 

  

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